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PANEL II:  Mickey Mice? Potential 
Ramifications of Eldred v. 
Ashcroft 
Moderator:  Hugh C. Hansen∗ 
Panelists: David O. Carson† 
 Eben Moglen‡ 
 Wendy Seltzer§ 
 Charles Sims|| 
 
MR. PERRY-CAMPF:# Welcome back everyone and welcome 
to those of you who were not here this morning.  My name is 
David Perry-Campf.  I am the managing editor for the Journal.  I 
would like to welcome you to the panel on Eldred: Mickey Mice?  
Potential Ramifications of Eldred v. Ashcroft. 
The moderator of the panel will be Hugh Hansen.  Professor 
Hansen has been at the Law School since 1978 and teaches various 
areas of intellectual property law.  Is that right? 
PROFESSOR HANSEN: That’s fine.  
MR. PERRY-CAMPF: He is one of the reasons why the 
Fordham Intellectual Property, Media & Entertainment Law 
Journal (IPLJ) is so successful.  I would like to thank him again 
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§  Staff Attorney, Electronic Frontier Foundation.  B.A., summa cum laude, Harvard 
College, 1996; J.D., cum laude, Harvard Law School, 1999. 
||  Partner, Proskauer Rose, LLP.  B.A., magna cum laude, Amherst College, 1971; 
J.D., Yale Law School, 1976. 
#  David B. Perry-Campf, Managing Editor, Fordham Intellectual Property, Media, 
and Entertainment Law Journal, Fordham University School of Law.  B.A., Whitman 
College, 1998; J.D. expected, Fordham University School of Law, 2003. 
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for being here and for moderating the panel.  Without further ado, 
because he doesn’t want any more ado, Professor Hugh Hansen. 
PROFESSOR HANSEN: Thank you very much.  First, I would 
just like to get a view of the audience.  How many people are 
familiar with the Eldred case and how many are not.1 
 [After shows of hands.] 
So we have quite a few who are not and some that are.  Okay.  
We will keep that in mind when we are speaking. 
For those who are not familiar with Eldred, take a look at a 
short piece that I did on the case before it was argued that appeared 
in the Preview of Supreme Court Cases.2  The journal was 
originally aimed to bring Supreme Court newspaper reporters up to 
speed to understand the oral argument and to write about the 
decision when it came down. 
We certainly have a distinguished panel that is fairly evenly 
balanced on the merits. 
The catalyst for this lawsuit was an extension of the term of 
copyright in 1998, the Copyright Term Extension Act (hereinafter 
 
1 Eldred v. Ashcroft, 123 S. Ct. 769 (2003).  The petitioners, individuals, and 
companies who excavate the public domain for works with expired copyright, challenged 
the constitutionality of the Copyright Term Extension Act of 1998 [CTEA], Pub. L. No. 
105-298, tit. 1, 112 Stat. 2827–28 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C. 
(Supp. V 2000)). Id.  The law increased the term of copyright by twenty years so that 
most works are protected for the life of the author plus seventy years. See 17 U.S.C. § 
302(a) (2000).  The petitioners claimed the law was unconstitutional under the Copyright 
Clause’s “limited Times” restriction and under the First Amendment’s free speech 
guarantee. Eldred, 123 S. Ct. at 775. See also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; U.S. CONST. 
amend. I.  The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, affirming a district 
court ruling, found the law constitutional. Eldred v. Reno, 239 F.3d 372 (D.C. Cir. 2001), 
aff’d, 123 S. Ct. 769 (2003).  The Supreme Court granted certiorari and heard oral 
arguments on Oct. 9, 2002. See Transcript of Oral Argument, Eldred v. Ashcroft, 123 S. 
Ct. 769 (2003) (No. 01-618), http://www.supremecourtus.gov/oral_arguments/argument_ 
transcripts/01-618.pdf.  On January 15, 2003, the Court affirmed the lower court rulings 
and upheld the law’s constitutionality. Eldred, 123 S. Ct. at 790.  In a 7-2 decision, the 
Court stated that the CTEA complied with the Copyright Clause’s “limited Times” 
prescription and did not create a perpetual copyright, was a rational exercise of the 
legislative power conferred by the Clause, and did not violate the First Amendment. Id. at 
781, 782–83, 789–90. 
2  Hugh C. Hansen, What Are the Constitutional Limits on Congressional Extensions of 
the Term of Copyright Protection?, 2001–02 PREVIEW U.S. SUP. CT. CASES 38. 
5 - PANEL II FORMAT 5/30/03  7:56 AM 
2003] POTENTIAL RAMIFICATIONS OF ELDRED V. ASHCROFT 773 
the “Act”),3 which members of Congress fondly called the Sonny 
Bono Copyright Term Extension Act.  People against term 
extension unfailingly also refer to it as such because it reflects their 
contempt for both Sonny Bono and the Act.4 
The original purpose of this Act was not based upon a 
copyright policy view that authors needed life plus seventy years 
of protection, the new term under the Act.  Rather, it was 
responding to the European Union Term of Protection Directive, 
which pushed copyright from life plus fifty to life plus seventy.5  
The reason for the directive also had nothing to do with copyright 
policy.  It was based upon the need for free movement of goods 
within the Community.  Germany's term of protection for 
copyright was life plus seventy, Spain had life plus sixty, and the 
rest of the member states had life plus fifty.6  This meant that it 
was impossible to circulate some goods completely freely 
throughout the European Union because in two countries they 
might have been protected by copyright whereas in the others they 
were in the public domain.  The answer was to increase protection 
in all Member States to life plus seventy.7 
 
3 See 17 U.S.C. § 302(a). 
4 See, e.g., http://eldred.cc/eldredvashcroft.html (last visited Apr. 6, 2003).  The 
website, which is maintained by CTEA opponents, repeatedly refers to the law as the 
“Sonny Bono Act.” Id. 
5 Council Directive 93/98/EEC, art. I, 1993 O.J. (L 290) 9 [hereinafter Directive 
93/98], reprinted in PAUL GOLDSTEIN, INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT: PRINCIPLES, LAW, 
AND PRACTICE 564 (2001). This directive harmonized the term of copyright among the 
member states of the European Union to life plus seventy years. Id. 
6 See Fred Koenigsberg & Joan T. Pinaire, Impact of International Copyright 
Developments in U.S. Practice, in IMPACT OF INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT DEVELOPMENTS 
IN U.S. PRACTICE, at 540 (PLI Pats., Copyrights, Trademarks & Literary Prop. Course, 
Handbook Series No. G4-3932, 1994) (“Copyright terms had previously varied 
throughout the EU.  Most member countries had adopted the minimum term required by 
the Berne Convention: the life of the author plus 50 years.  But others had longer terms: 
for example, life plus 60 years (Spain) or life plus 70 years (Germany and, for musical 
works, France).”). See generally Justine Antill & Peter Coles, Copyright Duration: The 
European Community Adopts “Three Score Years and Ten”, 18 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 
379 (1996). 
7 See Koenigsberg & Pinaire, supra note 6, at 540–41 (“Given the concept of a single 
internal economic market, it made no sense—indeed, it was counterproductive—to have 
varying terms of copyright in the EU.”). 
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Of course, the Community had a choice of bringing Germany 
and Spain down to life plus fifty.  This would have raised 
constitutional issues, however.  The German Constitutional Court, 
their Supreme Court for constitutional issues, had already made 
noises that it might find European Union actions that exceeded its 
authority under the Treaty not binding in Germany.  This risked a 
constitutional crisis within the European Union.8  Moreover, there 
was the general view that it was wrong to take twenty years off the 
term of those copyright owners who had an expectation based upon 
law of protection of their works for life plus seventy.9    
Differences of opinion among countries about intellectual 
property may result from whether a country is a net exporter or net 
importer of intellectual property products.10  Countries that are net 
exporters of IP products, as you might expect, are pro intellectual 
property.  Net importing countries, which are concerned with costs 
of all imported products, have more reservations.  The 
Netherlands, a net importer of IP products, is perhaps the most 
vocal of countries in this category.11  The Netherlands and three 
 
8 See the Bundesverfassungsgericht’s [German Federal Constitutional Court] 
Maastricht decision, BVerfGE 89, 155 [hereinafter Maastricht], translated in 33 I.L.M. 
395 (1994).  The decision, which upheld the constitutionality of the Treaty of Maastricht, 
was key to Germany’s participation in the future of an integrated Europe. See Steve J. 
Boom, The European Union After the Maastricht Decision: Will Germany Be the 
“Virginia of Europe?”, 43 AM. J. COMP. L. 177, 177 (1995).  The decision warned that 
“the Federal Constitutional Court will examine whether legal acts of the European 
institutions and organs are within or exceed the sovereign powers transferred to them.” 
Id.  The court added that legal acts of the Union that exceed the competences outlined in 
the treaty, as interpreted by the German court, will not be legally binding.  Id. 
9 See Directive 93/98, supra note 5, recital 9 (“[A] harmonization of the terms of 
protection of copyright and related rights cannot have the effect of reducing the 
protection currently enjoyed by right holders in the Community.”); Antill & Coles, supra 
note 6, at 380 (“[It] was deemed contrary to one of the general principles of Community 
law (regard for established rights) to reduce the term of protection already granted to 
rights owners in certain Member states.”). 
10 See, e.g., J. Thomas McCarthy, Intellectual Property—America’s Overlooked 
Export, 20 U. DAYTON L. REV. 809 (1995); Hamish McRae, The Business World: So, 
How Much Did Harry Potter Make for the Rest of Us?, INDEPENDENT (London), Feb. 7, 
2001, at 2 (discussing a recent International Monetary Fund report stating which 
countries are the biggest importers and exporters of intellectual property). 
11 See Hilary Clarke, EC Governments Agree on New Copyright Accord; Terms May 
Mean Protection for 100-Plus Years, HOLLYWOOD REP., Nov. 9, 1993 (“In a strongly 
worded statement . . . the Dutch government said the new rules ‘don’t just give 
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other net-importing countries were against the Directive.12  It just 
passed under the qualified majority voting scheme for directives.13 
 One reservation about the increase of the term of copyright 
was that it would benefit the United States the most.14  About the 
only thing that unites the world today is its anti-Americanism.  It is 
unlikely that the Term Directive would have been adopted if U.S. 
works received the benefit of the twenty year term extension.15 
So they did what they were allowed to under the Berne 
Convention, which was the rule of the shorter term, saying that 
unless your country also protects the same amount we protect, 
nationals of your country will not received the higher term of 
protection.16  I am convinced that the EU was hopeful that the 
United States would not adopt life plus seventy years.  This is 
because the amount of revenue leaving Europe would not be 
matched by the amount of term extension revenue leaving the U.S. 
for Europe, as there really are not that many European works that 
 
preference to the interests of the author over those of the consumer’ but ‘also complicate 
relations with third countries.’”). 
12 See Approval for 70-Year Copyright Protection, EUR. REP., Oct. 30, 1993 (“[T]he 
Luxembourg, Dutch and Portuguese delegations were opposed [to the resolution] and the 
Irish abstained.  France, Germany and Italy explained that they had approved the 
Directive because it guarantees free movement of copyrighted works while eliminating 
distortions of competition, because it will encourage literary and artistic creation and 
because it respects national peculiarities in copyright protection.”), available at 1993 WL 
2490038. 
13 See id. 
14 See Ruth Okediji, Toward an International Fair Use Doctrine, 39 COLUM. J. 
TRANSNAT’L L. 75, 79 & n.10 (2000) (noting that American industries that are heavily 
dependent on copyright habitually report considerable losses to the domestic economy as 
a result of copyright infringement abroad and arguing that the increase in international 
harmonization of intellectual property rules may promise heightened global enforcement 
of rights, which should in theory significantly benefit the United States).  This is also true 
because American music and movies might predominate in those for whom protection for 
life plus 70 would produce monetary reward. 
15 See McRae, supra note 10, at 2 (noting that the United States is the largest net 
exporter of intellectual property). 
16 Directive 93/98, supra note 5, art. 7, § 1. See also Berne Convention for the 
Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1886, 25 U.S.T. 1341, 828 U.N.T.S. 
221 [hereinafter Berne Convention] (establishing a basic term of life of the author plus 
fifty years), available at http://www.law.cornell.edu/treaties/berne/overview.html. 
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would get the advantage of the life plus seventy over here,17 and 
there are a lot of American works that would get the advantage 
and, therefore, take revenue out of Europe.18 
But Congress did pass life plus seventy.19  There were  
academics and some user groups in opposition.20  I think Congress 
basically saw it as a trade bill creating more jobs, tax revenues, et 
cetera.  The copyright policy arguments that were presented by 
some law professors in opposition to a term extension thus had 
little effect and Congress passed it.21 
Larry Lessig, a well-known academic, came up with a 
constitutional attack on the Act.  I thought it was doomed to lose.  
Most people in the copyright field thought likewise.  He lost in the 
district court;22 he lost in the court of appeals.23  I do not know 
 
17 See McRae, supra note 10, at 2 (“America may have an enormous appetite for 
foreign goods—German cars, Japanese TVs and so on—but it has no appetite for foreign 
intellect.”). 
18 See The Copyright Term Extension Act of 1995: Hearings on S. 483 Before the 
Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. 73 (1995) [hereinafter Hearings on S. 483] 
(statement of Sen. Orrin Hatch) (suggesting that the loss of twenty years’ copyright 
protection would hurt U.S. trade: “In a world economy where copyrighted works flow 
through a fiber optic global information infrastructure, American competitiveness 
demands that we adapt our laws—and adapt them quickly—to provide the maximum 
advantage for our creators.”). 
19 See 17 U.S.C. § 302 (2000). 
20 See Jenny L. Dixon, The Copyright Term Extension Act: Is Life Plus Seventy Too 
Much?, 18 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 945, 973 (1996) (“Opposition to the proposed 
extension comes primarily from the academic community.”); Letter from Mary Burgan, 
General Secretary of the American Association of University Professors, to 
Representative Henry J. Hyde, Chair, House Judiciary Committee (Oct. 8, 1997) 
(opposing copyright extension legislation), http://www.law.asu.edu/HomePages/Karjala/ 
OpposingCopyrightExtension/letters/aaup-01.html. 
21 See, e.g., 144 CONG. REC. S11672 (daily ed. Oct. 7, 1998) (statement of Sen. Leahy) 
(“The 1998 Report on Copyright Industries in the U.S. Economy issued by the 
International Intellectual Property Alliance indicates just how important the U.S. 
copyright industries are today to American jobs and the economy and, therefore, how 
important it is for the U.S. to give its copyright industries at least the level of protection 
that is enjoyed by European Union industries.”); 144 CONG. REC. H9950 (daily ed. Oct. 
7, 1998) (statement of Rep. Coble) (“[The bill] will give the United States economy 20 
more years of foreign sales revenue from movies, books, records and software products 
sold abroad. . . .  This bill is also good for consumers. . . .  When works are protected by 
copyright, they attract investors who can exploit the work for profit.  That in turn brings 
the work to the consumer . . . .”). 
22 See Eldred v. Reno, 74 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 1999), aff’d sub nom. Eldred v. 
Ashcroft, 123 S. Ct. 769 (2003). 
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anyone on either side of the debate who thought that certiorari 
would be granted.24 
When the Court granted certiorari, people were dumbstruck.  I 
had confidently predicted that certiorari would be denied.  People 
started thinking of reasons why the Court did grant certiorari.  Of 
course, Larry Lessig had been a clerk of Scalia.25  I do not know if 
that had any effect.  It probably did not hurt, but I am sure that 
certiorari was not granted just because of that factor.  But it was a 
puzzlement. Ultimately, the petitioners primarily objected to the 
so-called retroactive protection: protection for works already in 
existence.26 
There are various arguments that can be made against this.  The 
Preamble to the Copyright Clause states, “To promote the Progress 
of Science and the useful Arts”“Science” meaning learning and 
“useful Arts” meaning the patent-type inventionsCongress shall 
have the power to grant for “limited Times to Authors and 
Inventors exclusive Right to their respective Writings and 
Discoveries.”27  The argument goes that this clause somehow 
creates an obligation upon Congress only to enact copyright 
provisions whose purpose is to provide incentives for creation of 
new works. Protection for existing works, by definition, could not 
create incentives for their creation.28  The extension for existing 
 
23 See Eldred v. Reno, 239 F.3d 372 (D.C. Cir. 2001), aff’d sub nom. Eldred v. 
Ashcroft, 123 S. Ct. 769 (2003). 
24 See Linda Greenhouse, Justices to Review Copyright Extension, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 
20, 2002, at C1 (“The court’s action took the world of copyright holders and users by 
surprise.”). 
25 Lessig clerked for Scalia during the Supreme Court’s 1990–91 term. Stanford Law 
School, Lawrence Lessig: Curriculum Vitae, Stanford Center for Internet and Society, at 
http://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/lessig/bio/cv/ (last visited Mar. 10, 2003). 
26 See generally Brief for Petitioners, Eldred v. Ashcroft, 123 S. Ct. 769 (2003) (No. 
01-618) (attacking the retroactive extension of the copyright terms and arguing that the 
CTEA’s prospective and retroactive extensions of copyright terms are unseverable), 
http://eon.law.harvard.edu/openlaw/eldredvashcroft/supct/opening-brief.pdf. 
27 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
28 See Brief for Petitioners at 40–41, Eldred (No. 01-618) (“[W]indfall benefits for the 
economic well-being of authors and their heirs independent of any claimed incentive to 
create cannot constitute a legitimate, much less an important or substantial, governmental 
interest sufficient to justify a restriction of speech.”). 
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works is just a windfall at the expense of the public.29  There is 
dispute as to whether that requirement of providing incentives for 
creation necessarily flows from the preamble or not.30  Justice 
Souter, for instance, in the Supreme Court in oral argument 
indicated that it went beyond that; Congress had more discretion 
on how to promote science than to just provide incentives for new 
creative activity.31 
In any case, that argument coupled with a limited times 
argument meant that this extension was unconstitutional.32  There 
was also a First Amendment angle which was not completely 
independent of the other arguments.  This argument was not 
particularly clear but it seemed to be that copyright is a restriction 
of free expression and as such needs First Amendment scrutiny of 
some kind.   At the least, there should be the time, place, manner 
analysis used for content neutral state actions33  The thrust was that 
if you applied either the constitutional power analysis based upon 
of article 1, section 8, clause 8, or even low level First Amendment 
analysis, at least the application of term extension to existing 
works (so-called retroactive application) would be 
unconstitutional.34 
 
29 See Erwin Chemerinsky, Balancing Copyright Protections and Freedom of Speech: 
Why the Copyright Extension Act Is Unconstitutional, 36 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 83, 95–96 
(2002) (“The question is how to balance the moral rights of the producer of expression 
with the interests of the general public in the widest possible dissemination of speech.  
Copyright law does this when applied prospectively by giving authors and artists notice 
as to the protections that they will have.  Retroactive extension is a windfall, benefiting 
one group—the copyright holders, who may or likely may not be the producers, at the 
expense of another group—those who want wider dissemination of the speech.”). 
30 See Brief for the Respondent at 44, Eldred (No. 01-618) (arguing that rather than 
granting windfall benefits, the CTEA “allows copyright holders an opportunity to profit 
from their creative property to the extent that they succeed in making the works publicly 
available”), http://eon.law.harvard.edu/openlaw/eldredvashcroft/supct/government-brief. 
pdf. 
31 See Transcript of Oral Argument at 6–7, Eldred (No. 01-618). 
32 See Brief for Petitioners at 17–23, Eldred (No. 01-618).  Specifically, the petitioners 
argued that copyright terms under the CTEA were no longer “limited,” did not promote 
the progress of science, and were not compatible with the quid pro quo requirement of the 
Copyright Clause.  The petitioners further argued that history confirms that the law 
exceeded Congress’s power. Id. at 23–30. 
33 See id. at 34–47. 
34 See id. at 17–33 (noting the unconstitutionality of the retroactive provision under 
Copyright Clause). 
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We are fortunate to have speakers who will cover all sides of the 
argument, so that is enough background. 
We have among the panelists at least two who are squarely 
against the Act and its constitutionality.  One may not be for the 
Act on policy grounds but certainly thinks it is constitutional.  
David Carson is with the Copyright Office and we’ll see what are  
his public views.  I am the moderator, but 
PROFESSOR MOGLEN: But not moderate. 
PROFESSOR HANSEN: Some people say I am going to 
immoderate the panel today, which may be true.  But I do have a 
position on this. 
We will start out with Professor Moglen, who is at Columbia 
University.  He started out his professional career, after going to 
Swarthmore, on the technical side.  He was a Programmer/Analyst 
in the Programming Language Research and Development 
Department of IBM.  Then he went to law school at Yale.  At the 
same time he was going to law school, he was also getting a 
Masters and Ph.D. in History.  He was with Cravath Swaine & 
Moore for a year.  Then he clerked for Judge Weinfeld in the 
Southern District.  He probably did not even see daylight for long 
times in the winter as Judge Weinfeld worked his clerks very hard.  
He was a wonderful judge, probably the best district court judge in 
the country.  Then Professor Moglen went to clerk for Thurgood 
Marshall.  From there he started teaching at Columbia.  Eben 
teaches an English Legal History course, and the other one is 
Internet and Constitutional Law. 
Every speaker has twelve minutes, which leaves us plenty of 
time for discussion.   
Eben, please take it away. 
PROFESSOR MOGLEN: Thank you.  I am very pleased to be 
here.  I appreciate very much the invitation from the IPLJ to talk to 
you today about this fascinating, but actually rather unimportant, 
little case. 
I do want to say a couple of things in response to Hugh’s 
immoderate introduction, which I very much appreciate as clearing 
the ground. 
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The reason that we call the statute the Sony Bono Copyright 
Term Extension Act is that is what Congress called it,35 and they 
called it that because they needed the fact that this moron skied 
into a tree as an excuse for the perpetration of a particular crime 
against the public interest of the United States. 
Hugh is utterly factually incorrect.  The statute had nothing 
whatsoever to do with term extension in the European Union. 
The lawsuit, which began before the statute, was planned first 
in conversations that Larry36 and Charlie Nesson37 and I had at 
Harvard in 1994.  We knew that there would be the statute and we 
knew that there would be the lawsuit against the statute at a time 
when the European Term Extension Directive had not even issued. 
The reason that we knew all that was Mickey Mouse.  That is 
to say, we knew that, beginning in 2004, expiration of copyrights 
would begin.  It has nothing to do with individual authors, folks.  
Life plus seventy is total nonsense.  It has to do with the term of 
corporate ownership of copyrights.  We knew that the beginning of 
the mass media copyright expiration period would begin in 2004.  
Steamboat Willie, which is the moment at which the thugs take 
over culture in the United States, is 1928.38 
 
35 See  17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000) (“This title may be referred to as the ‘Sonny Bono 
Copyright Term Extension Act.’”). 
36 Lawrence Lessig represented Eric Eldred in Eldred v. Ashcroft, challenging the 1998 
Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act.  He is currently a Professor of Law at 
Stanford Law School.  Professor Lessig was the Berkman Professor of Law at Harvard 
Law School.  He is the author of The Future of Ideas and Codes and Other Laws of 
Cyberspace.  He teaches and writes in the areas of constitutional law, contracts, 
comparative constitutional law, and the law of cyberspace. See http://cyberlaw.standford. 
edu/lessig/bio/short/ (last visited Mar. 15, 2003). 
37 Charles Nesson is the William F. Weld Professor of Law at Harvard Law School and 
co-director of the Berkman Center for Internet & Society. See The Berkman Center for 
Internet & Society at Harvard Law School, Charles Nesson Harvard Law School 
Biography, at http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/nesson.html (last visited Mar. 10, 2003). 
38 See Disney Archives, Steamboat Willie, at http://disney.go.com/disneyatoz/archives/ 
movies/steamboat/steamboat.html (last visited Mar. 10, 2003).  Steamboat Willie was the 
first Mickey Mouse cartoon released, on November 18, 1928.  Prior to the passing of the 
CTEA, the original drawings of Mickey Mouse in Steamboat Willie would have expired 
in 2003. See Pub. L. No. 95-553, 90 Stat. 2541, 2572–76 (codified as amended at 17 
U.S.C. §§ 301–304 (2000)) (extending the term of protection to the life of the author plus 
fifty and extending the term of protection for works for hire to seventy-five years). 
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And so we knew that there would be special-interest legislation 
purchased from a hired Congress to extend indefinitely the 
corporate control of American culture, and we knew that it would 
be necessary to attack it. 
The revolution against intellectual property, which I represent 
in my work, thinks ten years ahead, which is why we are already in 
the post-Microsoft era, though you are not, and why we are already 
worried not about what will happen in Eldred but what will happen 
after the end of the recording industry, which, despite the fact that 
they are still paying Chuck’s bills, we are certain to bring about 
within the next fifteen years.39 
Eldred is in that sense a tiny, little sideshow in the fundamental 
activity, which is the deliberate and intentional destruction of the 
intellectual property system by people who recognize that in the 
twenty-first century, when all works of knowledge, learning, art, 
culture, music, useful information, and technical understanding 
have zero marginal cost, and can be given to everybody in the 
world for the same price that the same person receives them, it is 
immoral to exclude people from knowledge and from culture.40 
The system of private property and ideas is a system that befit 
the bourgeois capitalism of the twentieth century.  It is 
inappropriate to the conditions of the twenty-first century, as 
broadcasting and the private ownership or licensing of spectrum 
 
39 See, e.g., Eben Moglen, Liberation Musicology, NATION, Mar. 12, 2001, at 5 
(predicting the end of the recording industry due to OpenNap software that enables every 
computer to engage in music sharing without a centralized registry such as Napster); 
Eben Moglen, The Public’s Business, LINUXUSER, May 2001, at 66 (predicting that 
government contracts based on competitive bidding will go to firms that employ free 
software, which will result in a reduced dependence on Microsoft and free software 
holding the world’s largest market for computer software), available at http://www. 
linuxuser.co.uk/articles/issue10/lu10-Free_Speech-The_publics_business.pdf. See 
generally Eben Moglen, Columbia Law School, at http://emoglen.law.columbia.edu (last 
visited Mar. 10, 2003) (containing Eben Moglen’s curriculum vitae, research agenda, 
selected publications, and links to related sites). 
40 Cf. LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS 94–95 (2001) (quoting Thomas 
Jefferson and explaining why information should be free). 
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are inappropriate to the technical conditions of the twenty-first 
century.41 
A corps of people around the worldtens in the beginning, 
now hundreds of thousands, soon to be millionsare engaged in 
various collaborative enterprises to destroy that unjust system.  
One tiny piece of that activity is the elimination of those pieces of 
the copyright system that establish the control of culture on the 
parts of organizations utterly uncontrolled by the bought politics of 
the United States and the European Union.42 
Eldred is a tiny test of the relationship between the principles 
of the freedom of speech and the principles of the ownership of 
culture and ideas.43  It shocks the copyright lawyers that the 
Supreme Court grants certiorari because it shocks the copyright 
lawyers that there is the First Amendment at all.  It shocked even 
Melville Nimmer, who before his death did manage to point out 
that the ownership of Blackacre in perpetuity is acceptable where 
the ownership of Black Beauty in perpetuity is not, as Nimmer 
said, because of the First Amendment.44  What Eldred tests is the 
willingness of the Justices of the Supreme Court to recognize that 
fact now, at the opening of the twenty-first century. 
 
41 See MARJORIE HEINS, “THE PROGRESS OF SCIENCE AND USEFUL ARTS”: WHY 
COPYRIGHT TODAY THREATENS INTELLECTUAL FREEDOM, A PUBLIC POLICY REPORT 
(2002), http://www.fepproject.org/policyreports/copyright.html. 
42 See Brief of Amici Curiae of the Free Software Foundation at 12, Eldred v. Ashcroft, 
123 S. Ct. 769 (2003) (No. 01-618), http://moglen.law.columbia.edu/publications/eldred-
amicus.html; Daren Fonda, Copyright Crusade Eric Eldred Says the Latest Copyright 
Goes Too Far, BOSTON GLOBE MAG., Aug. 29, 1999, at 12. 
43 See Eldred, 123 S. Ct. at 769.  Petitioners challenged the constitutionality of the 
CTEA under the First Amendment and the Copyright Clause. Id. at 775.  Petitioners 
argued that Congress’s power under the Copyright Clause is contingent upon an 
exchange involving the author’s exclusive right for a limited time and a dedication to the 
public thereafter. Id.  Petitioners claimed “the CTEA is a content-neutral regulation of 
speech that fails inspection under the heightened judicial scrutiny appropriate for such 
regulations.” Id. 
44 Melville B. Nimmer, Does Copyright Abridge the First Amendment Guaranties of 
Free Speech and the Press?, 17 UCLA L. REV. 1180, 1193 (1970) (“Some may question 
why literary property should be treated differently from other forms of property?  If I 
may own Blackacre in perpetuity, why not also Black Beauty?  The answer lies in the 
[F]irst [A]mendment.  There is no countervailing speech interest which must be balanced 
against perpetual ownership of tangible real and personal property.  There is such a 
speech interest with respect to literary property, or copyright.”). 
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Now, I will say, in all candor, that in 1994 and thereafter, I was 
against bringing this lawsuit now.  My own personal preference 
was for a negotiated disposition, rather like that of the Sonny Bono 
Term Extension Act, that is to say, a comparatively short renewal 
of Michael Eisner’s ownership of everything.  My reasoning was, 
that as the logic of the needs of the widows and orphans (who are 
of course the exclusive possessors of Mr. Eisner’s stock) compels 
Mr. Eisner to strangle culture yet further by making everything a 
pay-per-view/pay-per-read subscription proposition for everybody 
on earth, the Congress and the judges will become increasingly 
aware of the fatal flaw in the extension of terms, a flaw which, 
despite Professor Hansen’s absolute commitment to this immoral 
and disgraceful system, he too recognizes and told you about.  He 
told you that the limitation of terms in existencehad the 
European Union, for example, chosen to shorten the term of 
subsisting copyrights45would have raised a taking-of-property 
problem even in their weak, lukewarm, and ludicrous European 
system of constitutional protection, let alone here. 
Yet, the brief of the United States Government in Eldred 
argues that Congress has plenary power to set the terms of 
copyrightssubsisting ones as well as copyrights to be issuedbe 
those terms what they may.46  And although the Solicitor General, 
himself personally arguing this case, was not asked by the Court 
the question, had he been asked whether Congress has the power to 
shorten the terms of subsisting copyrights, the logic of his brief 
would have required him to say yes.47 
 
45 See Directive 93/98, supra note 5. 
46 Brief for the Respondent at 7, Eldred (No. 01-618). 
47 See Brief of Amici Curiae of the Free Software Foundation, Eldred (No. 01-618).  
Authored by Moglen, the brief argues that under the logic of the Solicitor General’s 
apparent argument, Congress could pass a statute shortening the term of existing 
copyrights. Id. at 13.  “If the statute simply provided that the term of copyright be 
reduced to fourteen years, according to the Court of Appeals, that would satisfy the 
requirement of ‘limited Times,’ and there would be no occasion for the Courts to inquire 
into whether such a change promoted the progress of science and the useful arts, though 
copyright holders could well be expected to contend that such an alteration of the 
duration of existing copyrights deprived them of the benefit that the ‘copyright bargain’ 
supposedly ‘secures’ them.” Id. 
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Of course, had Congress chosen not to lengthen the term of 
copyright but to shorten it, they would have faced immediately, 
from Chuck and all the other hirelings of the thugs in Hollywood, 
an avalanche of arguments concerning takings of property rights, 
as Professor Hansen acknowledges. 
It is the fact that the public domain, the reversionary interest of 
copyrights, the constitutional limitation on the terms, can no more 
be adjusted without a taking of the rights of people than the term 
itself.48  In precisely the same way that the Supreme Court 
recognizes that you may take the interest of the reversioner of a 
lease in order to give the fee simple to the property owner as a 
matter of land reform only if you compensate.49  Facing squarely 
the question now presented, in all justice the Supreme Court would 
be compelled to agree that you cannot take the reversioner’s 
interest in the public domain without payment.50 
It is this fundamental unfairness of the legislation, which ought 
to vitiate the arguments by the copyright theorists who would 
themselves be agitated by a shortening of subsisting terms.  They 
ought to be on our side.  But, unfortunately, the bread of the 
copyright lawyers has always been buttered by the copyright 
industries, and remains so now. 
So what we have, in other words, is a purchased Congress, a 
piece of corrupt hireling legislation, a bought bar, and a co-opted 
academic circle of commentators, but also a vivid and unstoppable 
ongoing revolution. 
Now, they will tell you, I suppose, that Eldred is a lost case for 
my dear friend Professor Lessig, who is today in Japan, else I am 
sure he would want to be here.  They will predict, I have no doubt, 
some number of votes amounting as close to nine as they can 
fantasize, though on the transcript of the argument they will have 
 
48 See id. at 5, 9. 
49 See Haw. Housing Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984).  In Midkiff, the Court 
upheld a land distribution scheme implemented by the Hawaiian legislature.  The Court 
stated that the state could take property as long as it was for a public purpose even if the 
property ended up in private ownership.  That the government compensated landowners 
for the taking was dispositive on the issue of constitutionality even though the adequacy 
of compensation was not addressed by the Court. Id. 
50 See Brief of Amici Curiae Free Software Foundation at 11, Eldred (No. 01-618). 
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some difficulty counting past seven, no matter what they do.  And 
they will conveniently ignore for you that it takes four votes to 
grant certiorari in the Supreme Court and not a single one of those 
votes was a vote to affirm.  For the very reason that Professor 
Hansen himself suggested, everybody who thought they knew the 
answer in the case was for leaving it alone.  We had four votes, 
folks, on the morning of the argument.  On the Friday morning 
thereafter, when the case was decided, it is my belief that we had 
six.  If we have not even five, tant pis [pity], the revolution goes 
on. 
The end of the movie industry is twenty-five years off, no 
matter what, thanks to the sharing of video by everybody on planet 
Earth who wants to share it.  The end of the recording industry is 
ten years off for the same reason, and a good thing too.  The end of 
the software monopoly has already happened; you just do not 
know it yet. 
So from my point of view, Eldred represents a minor test of the 
willingness of the existing regime to modernize, to become the 
ancien regime peacefully, slowly, gradually, more in an English 
way than in a French one. 
But we do not care.  Our goal is justice.  We will take it either 
way.  Freedom now. 
Thank you very much. 
PROFESSOR HANSEN: I am just wondering when will we 
get to the argument on the merits.  Assuming that someone does 
not share your hatred for capitalism, corporations, the middle class, 
and everything that this country stands for, is there anything else 
that might support your position?  It was very interesting, though.  
A sort  of “Das Disney.”  It is a good thing they don’t have 
guillotines anymore, because Eisner would be in trouble, wouldn’t 
he? 
PROFESSOR MOGLEN: He’s in trouble already, is he not? 
PROFESSOR HANSEN: Maybe you will just improvise. 
Our next speaker is Charles Sims.  What do you think of 
Chuck?   The person on your left? 
PROFESSOR MOGLEN: Were you asking me? 
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PROFESSOR HANSEN: Yes. 
PROFESSOR MOGLEN: I think he is a superb lawyer.  He 
beat my brains out in the Second Circuit in the DVD cases, for 
reasons that still mystify me.51 
PROFESSOR HANSEN: All right. 
Chuck went to Amherst, then Yale, then clerked in the District 
Court of Rhode Island, and then for eight or ten years was with the 
ACLU, First Amendment practice, where he supervised Supreme 
Court practice and argued in the Supreme Court, Second Circuit, 
and other courts.  Now he is at Proskauer Rose LLP, where he is 
litigating copyright, First Amendment and defamation cases.  Most 
of Chuck’s clients in copyright litigation, I think, have been 
copyright owners, but I am not sure. 
MR. SIMS: And against Eben and his friends. 
PROFESSOR HANSEN: So welcome Chuck.  You have 
twelve minutes. 
MR. SIMS: Eben spoke spectacularly.  I had the pleasure of 
going to college in the late 1960s and early 1970s, I got out in 
1971, and that was like being in an old Students for Democratic 
Society (SDS) meeting.  That was just great. 
PROFESSOR MOGLEN: He admits to being there, you notice. 
MR. SIMS: And I know what side I was on, too. 
As I have watched the copyright wars over the last few years, 
one of the things that I have remarked to people, and I have never 
gotten confirmation such as this, is that the spirit on the other side 
is very much the spirit of the late 1960s.  It is very much the spirit 
of bring down the corporation, let it all fall down.  Eben has in 
great prose given us the locus classicus, I guess, of that position. 
Eldred was not an unimportant, little case until the day of its 
argument.  This was the case that Larry Lessig and Yochai 
Benkler, and I dare say Eben, although I didn’t hear him talk about 
it, thought was the single most important copyright case of a 
generation.  I think it is being repositioned as unimportant because, 
in fact, it will be lost, and it should be lost. 
 
51 See Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429 (2d Cir. 2001). 
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The arguments that were made here, the arguments that were 
made in the Supreme Court in the briefs by the petitioners and by 
their allies, are precisely the same arguments that were made to 
Congress.52  I do think it is fair to say that the law was passed a 
year or two early for them, in the sense that I think that there has 
gotten to be a movement of users, led by a group of 
academicscopyright professors they style themselves, although I 
think of them as the anti-copyright professors.  There is no other 
area of the academic professoriate that I am aware of, no other 
area, in which there is all of this passion on one side and very few 
people on the other.  Aside from the deans of the old copyright law 
professors, Bob Gorman, Paul Goldstein, and Jane Ginsberg, there 
is this group of forty-two of them or so who testified in Congress,53 
who filed briefs in case after case.  They have lost most of them.  
They feel very passionately, as Eben has just indicated to you. 
The question in this case is a constitutional question, or two 
constitutional questions.54  It is not whether the law was a good 
idea or not. 
It is whether Congress had the power to enact the law.55  As to 
that question, which Eben did not talk about very much, I think the 
answer can only be what the two lower courts held and what the 
Supreme Court, I dare say, will hold, which is that whether or not 
this is as good law.  Whether or not the Washington Post or the 
New York Times56 have editorialized against it on policy grounds, 
the fact is that Congress had the power because the framers of the 
Constitution gave Congress the power to secure copyright for 
 
52 See Eldred v. Reno, 239 F.3d 372 (D.C. Cir. 2001), aff’d sub nom. Eldred v. 
Ashcroft, 123 S. Ct. 769 (2003). 
53 See Hearings on S. 483, supra note 18. 
54 Brief for Respondent at I, Eldred, 123 S. Ct. 769 (2003) (No. 01-618). 
55 See Brief for the Petitioners at 28, Eldred, 123 S. Ct. 769 (2003) (No. 01-618). 
56 See, e.g., Copyrights and Wrongs, WASH. POST, Oct. 16, 2002, at A24 (“There is no 
question that the plaintiffs in the current litigation—a group of publishers and individuals 
who deal in public domain materials—have a righteous gripe against Congress’s move in 
1998 to offer an additional 20 years of protection.”); The Supreme Court Docket; The 
Coming of Copyright Perpetuity, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 16, 2003, at A28 (“This decision 
almost certainly prepares the way for more bad copyright extension laws in the future.”). 
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limited times, and in the case of corporations, ninety-five years is 
clearly a limited time.57 
Now, one of the most amazing things about this 
argumentand I think the moment at which it was securely lost 
was when the petitioners gave up on the proposition of trying to 
argue to the Court that ninety-five years was too long, or life plus 
seventy was too long.  They did not really make that argument.  
They, in fact, conceded that for prospective works it was not too 
long.58  It is impossible analytically to figure out how a period of 
time that is limited for works written in the future can violate the 
requirement that it be a limited time for other works.  There is no 
principled basis on which to bring a lawsuit complaining about the 
works from the 1920s and 1930s that are not going to get into the 
public domain for another twenty years and to not worry about 
what is going to happen eighty or ninety or 120, whatever it is, 
years from now about the last twenty years when nothing will go 
into public domain because of this law. 
So, having abandoned the proposition that it was possible to 
argue that this time is not limited, which is really the only issue 
that the Constitution and the enabling clause59 presents, they made 
a very curious argument. Their argument was essentially this: It is 
very difficult to tell you, Supreme Court, what is too long.  We are 
not prepared to tell you that ninety-five years is too long.  But we 
think you should make a structural gambit instead.  If you simply 
hold, as a matter of policy really, that Congress does not have the 
power to extend the term for works already written, then the 
problem solves itself.  Then there will not be the enormous 
pressure from the Walt Disney companies of the world to do what 
is done, and Congress, without these pressures from existing 
copyright owners, will be able to do its job and function as an ideal 
legislature of Thomas Jefferson and come to a just result.60 
 
57 See Eldred, 239 F.3d at 380. 
58 See Brief for the Petitioners at 48–49, Eldred (No. 01-618). 
59 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
60 See Brief for the Petitioners at 11, Eldred (No. 01-618). 
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It is a curious argument.  It sounds like a political science 
professor’s argument.  It sounds like a Yale Law School argument.  
It does not sound like a legal argument. 
I think that by the time Larry was up arguing the case, the 
whole enterprise had the smell of the lamp about it.  It seemed like 
a clever idea that a bunch of very smart people had concocted and 
they had ridden this horse as far as it would go, and by the end of 
the day it just didn’t really stand up to analysis. 
The historical claims that were made were proven, I think, by 
the briefs, entirely false.61  The fact is that extending copyright 
term for existing works is not something that Michael Eisner 
cooked up.  It is not something that paid shills for the movie 
industry concocted.  The very first Congress did it in 1790,62 and it 
had been done in 1831,63 in 1909,64 and in the consolidated period 
of time from the 1960s to 1976 in which Congress decided 
essentially to extend copyright to life plus fifty.65  So, with an 
unbroken history from 1790 forward, and with enormous reliance 
inferences, Justice Breyer pointed out, since 1976 there have been 
enormous numbers of peoplecreators, companies, creative 
companies, companies in the content businesseswho have relied 
on the extensions from 1976, bought and sold companies, bought 
and sold catalogues.66 
The arguments made in this case have equal application to 
what happened in 1976.  If the 1998 law was struck down, so too 
would have to be the 1976 law, with staggering consequences that 
it is hard to imagine the Court contemplating.67 
 
61 See id. at 23–27; Brief for the Respondent at 11–18, Eldred (No. 01-618). 
62 Act of May 31, 1790, 1 Stat. 124 (repealed 1802). 
63 Act of Feb. 3, 1831, ch. 16, § 2, 4 Stat. 436. 
64 Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 320, § 23, 35 Stat. 1075, 1080. 
65 Pub. L. No. 95-553, 90 Stat. 2541, 2572–76 (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 
301–304 (2000)). 
66 See Transcript of Oral Argument at 8, Eldred (No. 01-618). 
67 See Brief of Amici Curiae Association of American Publishers et al. at 25–31, 
Eldred (No. 01-618) (“Petitioners’ theory would unsettle, for tens of thousands of 
copyright owners, rights established by the 1976 Act and the extensions leading up to it.  
Countless transactions would risk being undone, and countless investment-backed 
expectations denied.”), http://eon.law.harvard.edu/openlaw/eldredvashcroft/supct/opp-
amici/aap.pdf. 
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Lessig answered that sometimes when future consequences 
look really bleak, you play a little with retroactivity and just have a 
constructive decision going on.68  Nobody on the Court, I thought, 
seemed persuaded by that.  A few of the people on the Court really 
made mock of it, pointing out that in the First Amendment area, for 
example, the Court had never either been presented with, much 
less adopted, any kind of argument like that, and it would be 
antithetical to most of the Court’s First Amendment 
jurisprudence.69 
I think, as I say, the question really is not whether the law is a 
good idea or not.  I am not sure I would have voted for the law.  
But I do think that we have a legislature.  There is good reason for 
Congress to be making these decisions.  It can consider widely all 
sorts of considerations. 
One of the considerations it had in mind, and which I think it is 
plain the European Community had in mind too, is that, although it 
seems like a long time, from the point of view of the functional 
purpose of copyright, which is to enable authors, creators, men and 
women, to care for their spouses and children, the whole next 
generation, the amount of time involved is now really equivalent to 
what it used to be.70  That is, people are living longer.  There was 
testimonythis is not just Michael Eisner going up on the Hill and 
testifying.  Quincy Jones testified.71  There were comments about 
Saul Bellow and various other creators who had children very late 
in life, and copyright has for more than a hundred years, I think, 
aimed to take care of their children for the whole balance of their 
lives as part of the incentivizing mechanisms that we have.72 
So the notion that it was an aim of the people who brought this 
lawsuit to bring down the motion picture industry, I think that is 
worth really thinking about.  There are motion pictures of great 
 
68 See Transcript of Oral Argument at 8, Eldred (No. 01-618). 
69 See id. at 13, 16–18. 
70 See S. REP. 104-315, at 10–11 (1996), available at ftp://ftp.loc.gov/pub/thomas/ 
cp104/sr315.txt. 
71 See Hearings on S. 483, supra note 18. 
72 See S. REP. 104-315, at 10–11. 
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power made all over the world.  I happen to be a Satyajit Ray73 
aficionado.  I watch his Indian movies a lot.  He, like most 
filmmakers, needs money to make films and needs copyright 
protection in order to do it.  The whole financing of motion 
pictures, whether they are meretricious movies by people who do 
one set of things, or wonderful art movies that others of us might 
preferbut the whole enterprise is really based on foreseeable 
revenues that come from at its base copyright law.74  The notion 
that a bunch of law school professors can blithely decide that this 
is a bad system, so let’s tear this down is not, I think, an attractive 
picture and I do not think it is going to be successful. 
PROFESSOR HANSEN: Thank you. 
Wendy Seltzer went to Harvard College and Harvard Law 
School.  She is a Fellow with the Berkman Center for Internet & 
Society at Harvard Law School, a research center devoted to the 
active study of law in cyberspace, where she leads the Openlaw 
project’s public discussion of Eldred and has assisted with the case 
since its inception.  She practiced litigation in intellectual property 
law as an associate with Kramer Levin Naftalis & Frankel LLP, 
and she teaches Internet Law as an Adjunct Professor at St. John’s 
University School of Law. 
Wendy. 
MS. SELTZER: I have been working on this case since its 
beginnings, leading the Berkman Center’s Openlaw forum for 
public discussion of the case.75  The time that its importance really 
came home to me was going down to Washington on the morning 
of October 9, 2002 and seeing a crowd lined up around the block 
outside the Supreme Court, many of whom had arrived there the 
night before, in order to hear a copyright case.76  These were 
members of the public lining up to hear lawyers arguing about 
copyright, in challenge to enact the Sonny Bono Copyright Term 
 
73 Satyajit Ray is an Indian filmmaker.  See http://www.satyajitray.org (last visited Apr. 
6, 2003). 
74 See Brief of Amici Curiae Association of American Publishers et al. at 25, Eldred v. 
Ashcroft, 123 S. Ct. 769 (2003) (No. 01-618). 
75 See http://eldred.openlaw.org. 
76 See Linda Greenhouse, Justices Hear Arguments in Challenge to Copyrights, N.Y. 
TIMES, Oct. 9, 2002, at C1. 
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Extension Act, that had passed on a voice vote and unanimous 
consent in the Congress, without a single vote of opposition. 
So what I see as an immediate ramification of the Eldred case 
is that that will not happen again.  Now we have a public watching 
what is happening in the copyright arena, the public concerned 
about the expansion of copyright and the trend toward copyright as 
property and as control, and a public that will be fighting these 
battles beyond Eldred.  Because Eldred is not just a fight about 
twenty years of copyright or about reclaiming Mickey Mouse for 
the public domain, but a fight to restore balance to the copyright 
law—the balance that the Constitution prescribes. 
The Copyright Clause tells us that Congress has the power to 
“promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for 
limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their 
respective Writings and Discoveries.”77  So to promote progress, 
the publication and dissemination of new works, Congress can 
grant limited monopolies in those works, and the clause is both the 
grant and the limitation on that congressional power.78  And the 
First Amendment constrains the exercise of congressional power 
because, after all, copyright is a restriction on speech.79 
The petitioners in Eldred argued that Congress has forgotten 
that balance, that Congress has abandoned the public side to the 
copyright grant by continually reaching into the past and extending 
the terms of copyrights long after they have promoted whatever 
creation they were going to promote—at the time the work was 
created.  By reaching in and continually lengthening those terms, 
Congress is taking from the public an interest that the public 
rightfully expected to get.  The public rightfully expected to gain 
free access to those works, to use them in new and creative and 
innovative ways from the public domain.80 
 
77 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
78 See Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 5 (1966). 
79 See 1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 1.10(A), at 
1-66.57 (2002) (“Congress is granted authority to legislate in a given field, it does not 
follow that such a grant immunizes Congress from the limitations of the Bill of Rights, 
including the First Amendment.”). 
80 See Brief for the Petitioners at 9–11, Eldred v. Ashcroft, 123 S. Ct. 769 (2003) (No. 
01-618). 
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Eric Eldred, the lead plaintiff, publishes public domain works 
with annotations and links to their historical context on his 
website, making them available to people who might not have had 
access to the works or their context.81  Other plaintiffs and amici 
restored old films that would otherwise have disintegrated denied 
to the public; still others reprinted out-of-print music and books 
and compilations of historical material.82  All of these groups, 
waiting, preparing to use works when they entered the public 
domain, instead had them snatched away for another twenty years 
because corporations such as Disney had the stronger lobbyists in 
Congress and wanted that extra revenue from exploiting Mickey 
Mouse and similar properties.83 
The argument about international harmonization proves too 
much, because there are plenty of places where the CTEA created 
more dissonance than harmony with Europe and other regions of 
the world.84  As a sovereign nation we are accustomed to 
promoting different goals through our unique copyright policy. 
Instead, what we are really looking at is Congresswoman Mary 
Bono’s statement, “Actually Sonny wanted copyright to last 
forever.  I am informed by staff that such a change would violate 
the Constitution. . . . [T]here is also Jack Valenti’s proposal for 
term to last forever less one day.  Perhaps the Committee may look 
at that next congress.”85  Or, as Peter Jaszi testified, Congress gave 
Sonny the next-best thing, “a perpetual copyright on the 
installment plan.”86 
The original Copyright Act was far more limited in scope than 
what we have now.  It granted fourteen-year monopolies on the 
 
81 See http://www.eldritchpress.org (last visited Mar. 10, 2003). 
82 See Brief of Amici Curiae the Internet Archive, Prelinger Archives, and Project 
Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation at 3–5, Eldred (No. 01-618), 
http://eon.law.harvard.edu/openlaw/eldredvashcroft/supct/amici/internet-archive.html. 
83 See HEINS, supra note 41, at 8–9. 
84 See Dennis S. Karjala, Harmonization Chart Between U.S. and E.U. After Adoption 
of the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act (May 15 2002), http://www.law.asu. 
edu/HomePages/Karjala/OpposingCopyrightExtension/legmats/HarmonizationChartDS. 
html. 
85 144 CONG. REC. H9951 (daily ed. Oct. 7, 1998) (statement of Rep. Bono). 
86 Hearings on S. 483, supra note 18 (testimony of Professor Peter Jaszi, American 
University Law School). 
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right to publish, republish and vend books, charts, and maps.87  
Now, 200 years later, copyright grants the author of any 
workliterary, musical, dramatic, visual, sound 
recordingsexclusive rights of reproduction, distribution, 
preparation of derivative works, public performance and displays, 
even digital transmissions of sound recordings, and all of this lasts 
for life of the author plus seventy years (or ninety-five years for 
works for hire), a far cry from the original fourteen-year monopoly 
that the original framers saw implemented.88 
But copyright is not meant to be absolute.  While it is limited in 
other ways than by termlimited by fair use, by idea-expression 
distinctions, and by the first-sale doctrinethose do not go all the 
way.89  They do not give us the freedom we need to make the 
widest range of other creative uses of works.  The reason those 
limits are enough to satisfy the First Amendment is, in part, 
because after a limited time, the copyright expires and the work 
enters the public domain.  Because after its copyright term ends, 
the work is freely available to be built upon in variations on a 
theme, to be put into derivative forms or annotated editions; to be 
made a part of common culture, and celebrated and criticized in 
that culture.90 
Instead, the extensions that Congress has continually enacted 
eleven times in the last forty years,91 reaching in and drawing out 
the copyright term yet further, have denied us that essential limit 
 
87 Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, §1, 1 Stat. 124 (repealed 1802). 
88 See id.; HEINS, supra note 41, at 3–5 (discussing the purposes behind copyright law, 
its extensions, and resulting problems). 
89 See 17 U.S.C. §§ 107, 109(a) (2000); Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 
U.S. 340, 349–50 (1991) (“[C]opyright assures authors the right to their original 
expression, but encourages others to build freely upon the ideas and information 
conveyed by a work.”). 
90 See generally Brief of Amici Curiae Free Software Foundation at 5, Eldred v. 
Ashcroft, 123 S. Ct. 769 (2003) (No. 01-618) (“In the sphere of copyright, the limited 
time requirement protects the public domain, by providing for its constant enrichment.”). 
91 See Pub. L. No. 105-298, 112 Stat. 2827 (1998); Pub. L. No. 94-553 § 304, 90 Stat. 
2572 (1976); Pub. L. No. 93-573 tit. I, § 104, 88 Stat. 1873 (1974); Pub. L. No. 92-566 § 
1, 86 Stat. 1181 (1972); Pub. L. No. 92-170, 85 Stat. 490 (1971); Pub. L. No. 91-555, 84 
Stat. 1441 (1970); Pub. L. No. 91-147, 83 Stat. 360 (1969); Pub. L. No. 90-416, 82 Stat. 
397 (1968); Pub. L. No. 90-141, 81 Stat. 464 (1967); Pub. L. No. 89-142, 79 Stat. 581 
(1965); Pub. L. No. 87-668, 76 Stat. 555 (1962). 
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on copyright that lets it serve its purpose of enriching the public for 
whose benefit it has served as an incentive to create in the first 
place. 
Art and literature are not created in vacuums.  Musicians from 
classical composers through folk, jazz, and rap have built upon the 
themes developed by their predecessors; because artists draw upon 
the work that comes before them; because literature reuses plots 
and charactersDisney himself took Snow White and Cinderella, 
and his company has taken Victor Hugo and the Little Mermaid, 
and made his own creations from them, yet it now wants to stop us 
from doing the same thing to Disney works.92 
So the Eldred case is an important case for all of the works and 
characters that it will restore to the public; for the chance that it 
will give us to use not just those famous works like the Mickey 
Mouse, but the tens of thousands of other works that are lying 
fallow because no copyright owner has seen fit to exploit them.  
The technology gives all of the public a chance to read, see and 
hear those works and to make new creations from them.93 
But even more, the Eldred case is important because it has 
helped to catalyze a movement, a movement that builds upon work 
that Eben has done with the Free Software Foundation,94 and 
builds on the ideas of James Boyle and environmentalism for the 
 
92 See SNOW WHITE AND THE SEVEN DWARFS (Disney 1938) (adapted from the fairy 
tale); CINDERELLA (Disney 1950); THE HUNCHBACK OF NOTRE DAME (Disney 1996) 
(adapted from VICTOR HUGO, THE HUNCHBACK OF NOTRE DAME (1831)); THE LITTLE 
MERMAID (Disney 1992) (adapted from Hans Christian Andersen, The Little Mermaid 
(1836), in THE COMPLETE HANS CHRISTIAN ANDERSEN FAIRY TALES (Lily Owens ed. 
1981) . 
93 See Brief for the Petitioners at 5, Eldred (No. 01-618) (“By using the technology of 
the Internet, [Eldred] is able to build texts that are available freely around the world.  By 
integrating search technologies and links, his texts enable students and scholars to study 
these works in ways that would be impossible with printed books.”). 
94 See Free Software Movement, About Free Software, Philosophy of the GNU Project, 
at http://www.fsf.org/philosophy/philosophy.html#TOCAboutFreeSoftware (last visited 
Apr. 6, 2003) (“Free Software  is a matter of freedom: people should be free to use 
software in all the ways that are socially useful.  Software differs from material objects—
such as chairs, sandwiches, and gasoline—in that it can be copied and changed much 
more easily.  These possibilities make software as useful as it is; we believe software 
users should be able to make use of them.”). 
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Net.95  It is a movement to recognize once again the importance of 
the free flow of information against this propertization and 
privatization of cultural expression.  It has built a movement that 
camped out on the Supreme Court steps on the principle that so-
called intellectual property should not limit free discussion.96 
PROFESSOR HANSEN: Thank you, Wendy.  Our final 
speaker is David Carson. David obtained a Bachelor of Arts degree 
and then a Master of Arts degree from Stanford.  He then went to 
Harvard Law School.  David first practiced with the Beverly Hills 
entertainment law firm of Cooper Epstein & Hurewitz.  He moved 
to New York and to Schwab Goldberg Price & Dannay, a very 
well-known, outstanding copyright firm, where he was a partner. 
From there he moved to become the General Counsel of the 
U.S. Copyright Office.  The General Counsel is the principal legal 
officer with responsibility for the Office’s regulatory activities, 
litigation, administration of the copyright law, and providing 
liaison on legal matters between the Office and Congress, 
Department of Justice, and other agencies of government.  While 
in practice, he wrote briefs and argued many cases in the copyright 
area. 
Let us see what his position is.  David? 
MR. CARSON: One of my purposes today is not to tell you 
what my position is, but we will see if I can manage that. 
I should start with a couple of disclaimers.  I am not here to 
speak on behalf of the United States Government.  Certainly, while 
this case is pending in the Supreme Court, there is only one person 
who is authorized to speak on behalf of the United States 
Government, the Solicitor General.  He did so eloquently a month 
ago, and I cannot add anything to that, and if I tried, I would get in 
trouble with the Solicitor General’s Office. 
 
95 See James Boyle, A Politics of Intellectual Property: Environmentalism for the Net?, 
47 DUKE L.J. 87 (1997). 
96 See, e.g., Brief for the Petitioners at 41, Eldred (No. 01-618) (“By retroactively 
extending copyright terms, Congress is directly re-allocating the right to speak.  It is 
choosing favored speakers . . . and disfavoring other speakers who would, but for this 
regulation, be permitted to develop derivative works, or perform free of the restrictions of 
copyright.”). 
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I am not here to speak in defense of the Sonny Bono Copyright 
Term Extension Act.  Actually, I am disappointed; I thought Chuck 
was going to do that, so I thought he would take some pressure off 
me.  But maybe no one here wants to defend it.  I certainly never 
have, and I doubt that I ever will. 
But I have no problem at all defending the constitutionality of 
the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act.  And if you accept 
for a moment the policy propositions urged by the people on my 
left and my right, to say the least, I think reasonable minds can 
differ on those policy propositions. 
If you take seriously the arguments made in the briefs as to 
why copyright term extension was a horrible idea, at the end of the 
day my response is that as a matter of constitutional law, Congress 
has the power to get it wrong.  So if Congress got it wrong, so be 
it.  There is nothing in the Copyright Clause and there is nothing in 
the First Amendment that tells Congress it cannot get it wrong.97  
And basically, I think most of the arguments—and certainly the 
best arguments, I have seen—are policy arguments, not 
constitutional arguments.98 
I would commend to you a couple of articles that I reread on 
the way up here by a couple of distinguished members of the New 
York legal academic scene. 
One was by Jane Ginsburg at a symposium at Cardozo about 
two years ago.99  I don’t mean to slight the other participantsBill 
Patry, Wendy Gordon, and Arthur Millerall of whom had very 
insightful comments, but Professor Ginsburg’s really struck a 
chord with me.  What she said essentially was that copyright term 
extension was a lousy idea but that it was not unconstitutional.  
Congress had the power to do that.100 
The other thing she saidand I am putting this in my own 
words now, certainly not her words, and it is something that 
 
97 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
98 See Brief for the Petitioners at 5, Eldred (No. 01-618). 
99 Jane C. Ginsburg et al., The Constitutionality of Copyright Term Extension: How 
Long Is Too Long, 18 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 651, 695–704 (2000). 
100 See id. at 697–704 (discussing policy concerns about the CTEA but also discussing 
why it could survive constitutional scrutiny). 
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concerns me greatlyis that she thought copyright term extension 
was probably a mistake.101  Why was it a mistake?  Well, look to 
my left and look to my right and you will see why it was a mistake. 
What the Copyright Term Extension Act turned into was, in 
my words, a poster child for everything that is wrong with 
copyright law.  It became basically a banner behind which 
opponents of copyright law could rally.  And it certainly has been 
very effective in doing that.  I think that were it not for copyright 
term extension—something that is simple for people to understand 
and people to take a position on—the folks who are opposing all 
sorts of legislation and just in general have qualms about the level 
of copyright protection we find in our society today—and I think 
that describes the people to my left [Professor Eben Moglen] and 
my right [Wendy Seltzer], but not my far left [Charles 
Sims]those people would have a much harder time getting any 
traction.  So the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act in 
many respects was a gift to them. 
I am not sure in the long run whether it is going to make any 
difference.  I wouldn’t expect it to make a difference in the Court, 
but we will see.  I am not going to offer any predictions there.  I 
predicted a year ago that there was not a chance that the Court 
would take the case because there were no serious constitutional 
issues.  I have retired from the business of predicting what the 
Court is going to do. 
Observe, however, that two years ago, the Court granted 
certiorari in New York Times Co. v. Tasini, and yet we had, I think, 
a 7-2 vote to affirm.102  So the fact that the Court takes a case does 
not necessarily mean the Court is ready to reverse.  Our most 
recent experience with a copyright case gives those folks who 
would like to see the Court affirm some reason to hope. 
Anyway, I would commend to you Jane Ginsburg’s remarks, 
which you can find in the Cardozo Arts & Entertainment Law 
Review.103 
 
101 See id. at 698–701. 
102 See N.Y. Times Co. v. Tasini, 533 U.S. 483 (2001). 
103 See Ginsburg et al., supra note 99. 
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Another piece that I would commend to you is something that 
was published in FindLaw on October 24, 2002 by Professor Marci 
Hamilton of Cardozo.104  Her arguments were in some respects the 
same as Professor Ginsburg’s, that copyright term extension is bad 
policythat’s her first headingbut she just doesn’t see the 
constitutional argument, and in many respects says the same kinds 
of things I think we heard Chuck say already.105 
She did make one observation that had not occurred to me yet, 
and I cannot say it is the be-all and end-all or that it really resolves 
the issue for me, but it was one that, as I said, had not occurred to 
me yet and one that I think is worth thinking about.  If there is one 
thing that is probably the primary item on the U.S. Government’s 
agenda with respect to international copyright, and it is one thing 
that most people I think can understand, it is our efforts to stamp 
out piracy worldwide106and piracy not necessarily, and not even 
primarily at this point, on the Internet, although that is becoming a 
very large part of the problem107but piracy just in terms of 
physical media.  You go to certain parts of the world and you 
cannot find a legitimate DVD or CD of music or of a motion 
picture because the pirated stuff has just flooded the market, and it 
is so cheap and the quality is good enough that the legitimate 
copyright owners simply cannot make a go of it.108 
Well, one thing that Professor Hamilton points out is that as a 
consequence of a reversal of the D.C. Circuit’s decision in the 
 
104 Marci Hamilton, Mickey Mouse Versus Wired Magazine: The Supreme Court 
Considers Whether a Law Extending the Copyright Term Is Constitutional, FindLaw’s 
Writ: Legal Commentary, at http://writ.findlaw.com/hamilton/20021024.html (Oct. 24, 
2002). 
105 See id. 
106 See id. (arguing that interference with the CTEA’s policy of copyright harmonization 
would allow many works still copyrighted in Europe to enter the public domain in the 
United States—“a recipe for piracy, and resulting international tension”). 
107 See Michael J. Muerer, Focus on Cyberlaw, Price Discrimination, Personal Use and 
Piracy: Copyright Protection of Digital Works, 45 BUFF. L. REV. 845, 881 (1997) (“It is 
easy to see that the Internet raises the threat of piracy. . . .”). 
108 See Christian John Pantages, Comment, Avast Ye, Hollywood! Digital Motion Piracy 
Comes of Age, 15 TRANSNAT’L L. 155, 178 (2002) (“Even for a powerful organization 
like the [Motion Picture Association of America], enforcing the intellectual property 
rights of its members outside the United States is difficult or nearly impossible.”); Susan 
Tiefenbrun, Piracy of Intellectual Property in China and the Former Soviet Union and Its 
Effects upon International Trade: A Comparison, 46 BUFF. L. REV. 1 (1998). 
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Eldred case would be that our copyright term here would revert to 
a shorter term than the term in Europe.109  “So what?” you might 
say. 
Well, one response to that is we may find ourselves becoming a 
piracy haven, at least vis-à-vis Europe, which is the most important 
market for the United States and with whom we generally try to 
have good relations.110  The notion behind that is that European 
works are protected in their own territory for life plus seventy.111 
And by the way, just as a footnote, an aside, I think Professor 
Moglen has his history wrong.  The European Union Directive on 
Copyright Term Extension was issued in 1993.112  It did not come 
out of the blue.  It was in the making for quite some time.113 
I think you can accept Professor Moglen’s characterization of 
the motives of the people in the private sector who asked Congress 
to enact the Copyright Term Extension Act.  I do not think there is 
anything unusual about private parties who have an economic 
interest in legislation pushing for that legislation.  But I do not 
think it is fair to say that the rationale that Congress adopted, or the 
rationale that was urged to Congress in adopting this, was simply 
to help Michael Eisner.  The rationale was, and the motivating 
force, and I suppose from Professor Moglen’s point of view 
perhaps, the excuse for enacting the law, was that Europe had in 
fact gone to life plus seventy and this was the trend.  This was the 
direction in which things were going.  We were going to get there 
sooner or later and because we are a leader in trying to have 
modern and appropriate levels of intellectual property protection 
worldwide, we should get on that train as well.114 
Let me return to the point that Professor Hamilton was making.  
If suddenly, and particularly with the Internet, all of these works 
 
109 See Hamilton, supra note 104. 
110 Id. 
111 Id. 
112 Directive 93/98, supra note 5. 
113 Tim Dabin, EC Must Unify Copyright Laws, BILLBOARD, October 16, 1993, at 8 (The 
“European Commission has been masticating the directive that would produce [copyright 
harmonization] for years now.”). 
114 Brief for the Respondent at 25–26, Eldred v. Ashcroft, 123 S. Ct. 769 (2003) (No. 
01-618). 
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that are still under copyright in Europe are suddenly freely 
available in the United States and freely available from websites in 
the United States, we are going to have problems with our friends 
in Europe.115 
Now, is that a reason to extend copyright, in and of itself?  I 
would not pretend that it is.  But it was an original thought that I 
think was one that would certainly give those folks in the United 
States responsible for our international copyright relations some 
pause. 
I meant to bring a letter that the Register of Copyrights 
received earlier this year, and I discovered I forgot to slip it in to 
my briefcase, but I called and had someone dictate it to me. 
I should note that the Copyright Office in 1995, before my 
time, at the time that this legislation was first pending, did come 
out in favor of term extension, and the Register of Copyrights gave 
some very lengthy testimony in which, I think it is fair to say, she 
ultimately said as a matter of policy it is a close call, but on 
balance we think it makes sense.116 
This year she got a letter.  I will read it to you: 
 Dear Ms. Peters: I have been spending a great deal of 
time reviewing testimony on the Sonny Bono Copyright 
Term Extension Act, for obvious reasons.  I was struck in 
reading your testimony by how extraordinarily balanced 
and conscientious you were, to emphasize the costs of term 
extension while also adding your views about the benefits.  
This was more than completeness.  It reflected an integrity 
that was too rare in contexts like that.  Thank you. 
 
115 See Hamilton, supra note 104 (“Striking down a law that strikes an international 
balance is not something any court could or should feel very comfortable doing, 
especially on the slender reed of the argument that ‘70 plus life’ is, in effect, no longer 
‘limited.’”). 
116 Copyright Term Extension Act of 1995: Hearings on H.R. 989 Before the Subcomm. 
on Courts and Intellectual Property of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. 
1–22 (1995) [hereinafter Hearings on H.R. 989] (testimony of Marybeth Peters, Register 
of Copyright and Associate Librarian for Copyrights Services). 
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 With warm regards, 
   Lawrence Lessig117 
We should not pretend that copyright term extension was 
without costs.  Of course it was, and we have heard people tell us 
what those costs were.118  On balance, Congress made the policy 
judgment, which I think Congress had absolute power to do, that 
term extension was appropriate.  It was within Congress’s power to 
do that.  And while I am not going to predict what the Court will 
do, I guess I am not terribly worried. 
A final word: Professor Moglen said this is not a very 
important case.  I think the answer is that it depends.  If the Court 
affirms, then I would agree, I think this is not a very important 
case; it is just one of those little historical footnotes.  If the Court 
reversesand, of course, it depends on the ways in which the 
Court reversesthen this is an incredibly important case, because 
to do that, I think, the Court is going to have to challenge the 
conceptions we have had about copyright—and that will not come 
as a great shock or disappointment to some of the people sitting up 
there—conceptions we have had for a couple of centuries. 
It is hard for me to imagine how the Court can reverse without 
seriously tying Congress’s hands in the future to amend copyright 
lawand not just with respect to term, but with respect to all sorts 
of other things, such as scope of copyrightin ways that I think 
many of us would live to regret if that is the way it turns out. 
Thank you. 
 
117  Letter from Lawrence Lessig, Professor of Law, Stanford School of Law, to 
Marybeth Peters, Registrar of Copyrights, U.S. Copyright Office (Mar. 19, 2002) (on file 
with David O. Carson). 
118 Id. at 64–65. 
There are some costs to term extension, however, and they must be weighed 
against the benefits. While it does appear likely that as a result of term 
extension, some items may become more expensive, the impact on individual 
consumers should be minimal. . . .  When it comes to choosing whether to 
protect authors or slightly decrease costs associated with making materials 
available, the balance should be in favor of authors. 
Id. 
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PROFESSOR HANSEN: First, let me just say everyone at this 
table seems to think that Sonny Bono, one of my heroes, and his 
act 
PROFESSOR MOGLEN: He was a very nice man. 
PROFESSOR HANSEN: I do not know.  He could have been a 
jerk.  But I certainly  you know, I am not saying 
MR. SIMS: Do not speak ill of the dead. 
PROFESSOR HANSEN: The point seems to be that most, if 
not all, of the speakers think that a twenty year extension is bad 
law and bad policy.  Implicit, in this is an acceptance of the public 
domain as an unqualified good. Moreover, some seem to think that 
those who want protection are bad or even evil and should die by 
hitting a tree.  Some critics of copyright are really talking about the 
capitalist system. 
But back to the attack upon copyright.  It is not an evil 
monopoly.  It is not even a monopoly.  Copyright protection does 
not give the power to control prices or exclude competitors.  
Copyright is just a bundle of rights with regard to some intangible 
res or thing.  In this sense it is no different from forms of tangible 
property. A copyright is ownership and ownership is not the same 
as a monopoly.  It is important to keep in mind that copyright 
protection only prevents copying. A third party can completely 
independently create the exact same work.119 
Now, they used to say, “Those who can do, do, and those who 
cannot do teach.”  Well, those who can create, create, and those 
who can’t, do the public domain.  It is somewhat sad that 
reproducing works that are out of copyright is somehow viewed as 
equally or even more meritorious than creating those works in the 
first place. 
 
119 See Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, 191 F.2d 99, 103 n.16 (2d Cir. 1951). 
Copyright is, in fact, only a negative right to prevent the appropriation of the labours of 
an author by another.  If it could be shown that two precisely similar works were in fact 
produced wholly independently of one another, the author of the work that was published 
first would have no right to restrain the publication by the other author of that author’s 
independent and original work. 
Id. (quoting W. COPINGER, THE LAW OF COPYRIGHT 2 (7th ed. 1936)). 
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  In fact, getting twenty years more copyright protection for 
works will have little effect. For most works that old, no one will 
want to use them.  For those works that will be used, probably no 
one will be around to care about the copyright and for those who 
are around and care, most will be happy to give a royalty-free 
licenses.   And if someone wants to be paid, fine—pass on the 
costs to the consumer. 
And how many people who be using these very old works on 
the Web or elsewhere will care about licenses and clearing rights?  
I mean, most of the stuff you get on these websites treat all works, 
current and old, as if they are in the public. 
MR. CARSON: Is there a moderator in the room? 
PROFESSOR HANSEN: No.  We have a bunch of people 
saying this extension is horrible, just horrible. Twenty more years 
of deprivation.  Like Chicken Little, they think the sky is falling 
but it is not.  In fact, the Act will lead to increased revenue from 
Europe to United States which means more jobs and more tax, 
revenue.  Many more people will be benefited indirectly from the 
increased revenue than will be deprived of access to works by the 
twenty year extension.  Moreover, the some of the increased 
revenue may lead to the funding of new creative projects.   
Some say this is all about Steamboat Willie?  Do you think 
anyone in the public cares about Steamboat Willie?  He does look 
like the Mickey we know and love today and he is not alike in 
character. But Steamboat Willie is not Mickey Mouse and his 
going into the public domain would not have threatened the 
commercial viability of  the Mickey Mouse character of today. 
So what are the effects when a work goes into the public 
domain?  Are they all good?  Let’s say a play goes into the public 
domain.  A producer puts it on.  Is the ticket cheaper?  All the 
public domain accomplishes is that the producer is able to put on 
the play without obtaining a license or paying the creator.120  Is 
 
120 See Hearings on S. 483, supra note 18, at 15–16 (1995).  Irwin Karp states, “[T]he 
advantage of the ‘public domain’ as a device for making works more available to the 
public is highly overrated; especially if availability is equated to ‘low cost’ to the public.”  
Jack Valenti states that public domain works do not circulate more widely or cheaply 
under actual marketplace conditions. Id. at 41–42. 
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that good?  It might mean that producer will be drawn to revivals 
of works in the public domain rather than take risks with new 
works.  Do we want a lot of works that were created 100 years ago 
repackaged and performed or distributed, or do we want that 
money and energy going into new works and to new creators? 
We are told that the public domain is great for consumers.  As 
we have just seen, if they want new works it is not.   And it they 
want old works they will not pay less for them even if they are in 
the public domain.121   In short, I am just saying there is something 
to be said for protection and there are downsides to the public 
domain. 
You are going to have your chance to comment.  But just 
before we forget the thought, let’s have some predictions on what 
the Supreme Court will do.  It will be interesting to see later on 
whether our predictions are right. 
Chuck, do you have a prediction? 
MR. SIMS: Oh, yes.  I think the D.C. Circuit’s decision will be 
affirmed 8-1. 
PROFESSOR HANSEN: Stevens is the dissent? 
MR. SIMS: I actually think it will be Breyer. 
PROFESSOR HANSEN: Okay. 
PROFESSOR MOGLEN: The majority opinion is by John 
Paul Stevens for five or six.  The primary dissent is written by 
Justice Ginsberg and is joined by the Chief Justice, Justice 
Thomas, and possibly Justice Kennedy.  The rest of the votes are 
ours. 
PROFESSOR HANSEN: I didn’t hear all of that. 
 
121 See generally Hearings on H.R. 989, supra note 116, at 238–39 (statement of Quincy 
Jones) (“The alternative to copyright protection is, of course, that works will fall into the 
public domain.  While the term ‘public domain’ implies that the ultimate public, the 
consumer, will have free and easy access to creative works, this is really not the case.  
The price of a quality compact disc recording of Beethoven is no less expensive than the 
price of a Pearl Jam CD.  The record company that manufactures the CD does not have to 
pay royalties to the Beethoven estate and these cost savings are not passed on to the 
consumer.”). 
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PROFESSOR MOGLEN: I said the majority opinion is written 
by John Paul Stevens. 
PROFESSOR HANSEN: I heard that. 
PROFESSOR MOGLEN: The primary dissent is written by 
Justice Ginsberg.  She is joined by the Chief Justice, who assigned 
it to her, Justice Thomas, and possibly Justice Kennedy.  The rest 
are ours. 
PROFESSOR HANSEN: Okay.  Do you have doubts about 
anything, Eben? 
PROFESSOR MOGLEN: Many things, one is which if you 
have ever been in any contact with the Internet. 
PROFESSOR HANSEN: You mean your thought is I haven’t 
yet been infected? 
PROFESSOR MOGLEN: My thought is you haven’t even 
been impinged upon. 
PROFESSOR HANSEN: I haven’t even been what? 
PROFESSOR MOGLEN: Noticed.  Since I don’t quite 
comprehend why it is that you think that people pay for public 
domain literature, which they do not. 
MR. SIMS: Of course they do.  I mean, in any bookstore 
PROFESSOR MOGLEN: They do if they buy their books in 
bookstores.  But since public domain literature has zero marginal 
cost, they do not have to pay for it at all if they do not want to.  
They voluntarily pay publishers for the convenience of emitting 
public literature conveniently-sized and bound paper, which is also 
what they will do in order to get such Satyajit Ray movies that they 
love or Mick Jagger music that they want. 
We are not talking about whether works will get created.  We 
are talking about whether exclusion from those works will be 
decreed for those who cannot pay.  The real subject of the 
conversation is not wheat.  The real subject of the conversation is 
something that everybody can get for nothing if anybody has it 
and, therefore, whether it is fair to exclude people. 
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PROFESSOR HANSEN: Is this the majority or the dissent, 
Eben?  Which opinion is this?  All I asked you for was the vote.  
You can come back and give your 
PROFESSOR MOGLEN: I gave you the vote.  You asked me 
further questions, and then you asked me whether I 
PROFESSOR HANSEN: All right.  Then it goes on to David.  
Pass the baton, all right. 
MR. CARSON: I am going to drop the baton.  I don’t think I 
can make any predictions. 
PROFESSOR HANSEN: Okay. 
Wendy, do you have a vote? 
MS. SELTZER: Well, I don’t have the details worked out the 
way Eben has.  I would say Eldred by six or seven. 
PROFESSOR HANSEN: Well, I don’t like to go out on a limb, 
but  I think definitely Eldred is going to lose.  I think Stevens will 
be in dissent.  I think Breyer might be in dissent.  I have trouble 
seeing any of the others clearly in dissent.  I think clearly in the 
majority are the hard core of O’Connor, Ginsberg, and Souter.  
And I think you probably have the Chief Justice in there.  You are 
probably also going to have Scaliaor maybe not Scalia, but you 
will have Thomas. 
So I have real trouble seeing any clear dissenters, other than 
Stevens.  Justice Stevens, as I see it, is a 1950s antitrust lawyer, 
and as William Wordsworth said, the child is father of the man.122  
Translated to lawyers means: how you grew up professionally and 
what influenced your views at an early stageand I’m really 
concerned about how you grew up, Ebenaffect you and your 
views throughout your legal or judicial career.  Stevens in practice 
was imbued with the 1950s antitrust view of intellectual property, 
and he has been consistent ever since, voting against the 
intellectual property owner in almost every case.123 
 
122 See William Wordsworth, My Heart Leaps Up (1802), available at http://www. 
bartleby.com/145/ww194.html. 
123 See, e.g.,  Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984).  In this 
case, Justice Stevens delivered the 5-4 majority opinion that the sale of videotape 
5 - PANEL II FORMAT 5/30/03  7:56 AM 
808 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. 13:771 
Breyer, of course, had his piece, The Uneasy Case for 
Copyright,124 but other than that, I have trouble finding other 
justices in dissent.  But time will tell, and I absolutely agree it is 
difficult to predict. 
Now we will go through one more time for people’s rebuttals, 
comments, or whatever. 
Eben, why don’t you continue with yours? 
PROFESSOR MOGLEN: No, I pass. 
PROFESSOR  HANSEN: Are you in a snit now, Eben, or 
what? 
PROFESSOR MOGLEN: Certainly not. 
PROFESSOR HANSEN: Okay, good. 
Wendy, why don’t you? 
MS. SELTZER: Well, I was anxious to jump in on the value of 
revivals of works in the public domain.  I think plays are the 
perfect example of where we see a wider range of performances 
once a work has come out of the exclusive control of its copyright 
holder.  Suddenly, we can see Porgy and Bess with a cast re-
imagined, not only the all-black cast that the Gershwin estate 
mandates;125 we can see women in Waiting for Godot.  We can see 
characters in different contexts and critical studies with 
interpretations that might not have the approval of the author or his 
estate.126  So its not only a matter of how much the performance 
costs—if we’re paying the actors as much, great for the actors—we 
 
recovered to the general public does not constitute contributory infringement of 
copyrights. Id. at 428–56. 
124 Stephen Breyer, The Uneasy Case for Copyright: A Study of Copyright in Books, 
Photocopies, and Computer Programs, 84 HARV. L. REV. 281 (1970). 
125 Dinitia Smith, Immortal Words, Immortal Royalties? Even Mickey Mouse Joins the 
Fray, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 28, 1998, at B7 (“Marc G. Gershwin, a nephew of George and 
Ira Gershwin and a co-trustee of the Gershwin Family Trust, said: ‘ . . . [W]e’ve always 
licensed “Porgy and Bess” for stage performance only with a black cast and chorus. That 
could be debased. Or someone could turn “Porgy and Bess” into rap music.’”). 
126 See, e.g., SunTrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257 (11th Cir. 2001) 
(allowing publication and distribution of ALICE RANDALL, THE WIND DONE GONE: A 
NOVEL (2001), a parody of MARGARET MITCHELL, GONE WITH THE WIND (Scribner 1996) 
(1936)). 
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are getting a very different experience once the work has emerged 
from copyright’s control. 
Returning to the point about trade balance, literary works are 
not wheat. When we have art and literature that can be given to 
everyone and not diminish in their value, our goal should be to get 
those out to as many people as possible and not to create an 
artificial scarcity so that a few can make money off them.127  We 
should be celebrating the chance that technology gives us to 
disseminate these intellectual products more widely. 
PROFESSOR HANSEN: David, do you have anything to say? 
MR. CARSON: Well, there were a few comments I heard that I 
guess I would like to respond to. 
First of all, it does not shock copyright lawyers that there is a 
First Amendment at all.  I think Chuck is a pretty good example of 
the marriage of copyright and the First Amendment.  I have done 
my share of First Amendment work, and many, many copyright 
lawyers I know have.  That should not be surprising, because a 
good deal of First Amendment work is done by lawyers 
representing the media.  Media does happen to own copyrights.  
There is nothing inconsistent between the notion of copyright and 
the First Amendment.128  In fact, it is a pretty nice marriage that 
works pretty well. 
I would argue, and I am certainly not the firstcertainly the 
court in the District of Columbia Circuit agreedthat copyright is 
an engine of First Amendment expression and that the doctrines 
within copyright, such as fair use,129 such as the idea/expression 
dichotomy,130 such as the merger doctrine,131 very, very easily 
 
127 See generally LESSIG, supra note 40 (arguing that the increased power wielded over 
the Internet by large corporate interests threatens to close off important avenues of 
thought and free expression). 
128 See generally Henry S. Hoberman, Copyright and the First Amendment: Freedom or 
Monopoly of Expression?, 14 PEPP. L. REV. 571 (1987) (discussing how courts and 
legislatures have attempted to reconcile the tensions between the Copyright Clause and 
the First Amendment). 
129 See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000); Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 669 
(1994). 
130 See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b). 
131 See Yankee Candle Co. v. Bridgewater Candle Co., 259 F.3d 25, 36 (1st Cir. 2001) 
(explaining that the merger doctrine applies when “[t]here is essentially only one way to 
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accommodate all the First Amendment interests that are necessary 
to accommodate. 
We heard Steamboat Willie mentioned a couple of times.  We 
have heard about how Walt Disney just raided the public domain 
and then created his own copyrighted works out of it.  Okay, fair 
point.  I don’t know whether this is true, but I have been told that 
Steamboat Willie was in fact a parody of Buster Keaton’s motion 
picture Steamboat Bill.132  I do not know whether that is true, but 
that is what I am told.  Certainly at the time Steamboat Willie was 
made, Steamboat Bill was protected by copyright.  I am not aware 
of any reports of Buster Keaton, or whatever studio produced 
Steamboat Bill, filing suit against Walt Disney for copyright 
infringement.  Why?  Probably because of the fair use doctrine, 
which very comfortably accommodates parodies.133  Look at the 
Wind Done Gone case, if you have any doubts about that.134 
So the notion that there is this opposition between copyright 
and the First Amendment is just fundamentally false.  I think many 
of us who practice copyright law would find some other job if we 
were persuaded that copyright was somehow inconsistent with the 
First Amendment. 
Wendy mentioned something that appears throughout the 
briefs, and has appeared throughout the briefs in this case since it 
was filed in the district courtshe should know better and Larry 
Lessig should know betterthis thing about Congress extending 
copyright term eleven times in forty years.  It is a recurring theme, 
and it is there for a reason.  It is there because the larger theme that 
they are trying to argue is that Congress cannot help itself; every 
time you look at it, it turns around and extends copyright term.  
This isI think she quoted Peter Jaszi“a perpetual copyright on 
the installment plan.”135 
 
express an idea, the idea and its expression are inseparable and copyright is no bar to 
copying that expression.”). 
132 See Lawrence Lessig, Keynote Address at the Open Source Convention (Aug. 15, 
2002), available at http://www.oreillynet.com/pub/a/policy/2002/08/15/lessig.html. 
133 See SunTrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257 (11th Cir. 2001). 
134 Id. 
135 Hearings on S. 483, supra note 18. 
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There is so little truth to that that it is laughable, and it is 
demonstrably wrong.  Of those eleven times in the last forty years, 
I think nine were interim extensions which were based upon 
Congress’s recognition that it had already determined in the 
context of a very, very lengthyyears and years and 
yearsprocess of omnibus revision of the copyright law to move 
from our two-term process, where we had two terms of twenty-
eight years each, to the Berne standard of life plus fifty.136  Once 
that decision was made, and prior to ironing out all the other 
wrinkles that had to be taken care of in order to enact an omnibus 
copyright revision, which finally came in 1976,137 Congress 
decided, starting in 1961, that we were moving to life plus fifty and 
therefore preserved the copyrights of works about to fall into the 
public domain because it had already decided they were entitled to 
life plus fifty, and because it had already decided they were 
entitled to life plus fifty.”138 
So for several years, Congress had one- or two-year 
extensions.139  To say that these are each an independent extension 
and an example of Congress’s profligate extension of copyright 
term is just a lie.  It is nothing short of a lie. 
It was simply Congress’s placeholder in order to memorialize 
something that had already been decided.  Congress extended 
copyright in 1976, fair enough.140  It extended it in 1998, fair 
enough.141 
The notion that this is perpetual copyright on the installment 
plan again is demonstrably false.  If it was an attempt to do that, at 
least, Congress failed miserably.  Works passed into the public 
domain shortly after the 1976 Copyright Act went into effect, 
notwithstanding Congress’s extension of copyright term, and they 
 
136 See Ginsburg, supra note 99 at 693. 
137 See Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. §§ 101–914 (1976). 
138 See id. § 303. 
139 See Pub. L. No. 92-566 § 1, 86 Stat. 1181 (1972); Pub. L. No. 92-170, 85 Stat. 490 
(1971); Pub. L. No. 91-555, 84 Stat. 1441 (1970); Pub. L. No. 91-147, 83 Stat. 360 
(1969); Pub. L. No. 90-416, 82 Stat. 397 (1968); Pub. L. No. 90-141, 81 Stat. 464 (1967); 
Pub. L. No. 89-142, 79 Stat. 581 (1965); Pub. L. No. 87-668, 76 Stat. 555 (1962). 
140 17 U.S.C. §§ 101–914. 
141 CTEA, Pub. L. No. 105-298 tit. 1, 112 Stat. 2827 (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 17 U.S.C. (Supp. V 2000)). 
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continued to go into the public domain every year until the Sonny 
Bono Copyright Term Extension Act was enacted in 1998.142 
And yes (with one exception), works will not go into the public 
domain due to expiration of copyright term until that twenty-year 
period has occurred, and you can determine for yourself whether 
that is regrettable or not.  But it is hardly perpetual copyright on 
the installment plan. 
I, for one, would be shocked if Congress in our lifetimes ever 
extended copyright term again, and I see no evidence for anyone to 
believe that that is on anyone’s agenda. 
I will mention that, come January 1 of next year, a vast number 
of works will enter the public domain due to the expiration of 
copyright term.143  Section 303 of the Copyright Act provides that 
any work created before 1978 that is unpublished, and which 
therefore on January 1, 1978, was converted from a perpetual 
common law copyright to a statutory copyright, to a statutory 
copyright will go into the public domain starting on January 1 of 
next year if the standard term of life plus seventy has already 
passed and if the work has not been published prior to the end of 
this year.144  An uncountable number of works will pass into the 
public domain by virtue of that. 
There was one provision, by the way, that in the original 
version of the Copyright Term Extension Act would have 
postponed that date for another ten years.145  In part because of the 
Copyright Office, and in part because Congress, and in part 
because Congress just saw the justice of it, the decision was made 
not to do that and to keep this date as it is.  So works will continue 
to go into the public domain. 
I could say more, but I think I have probably taken up more 
than my allotted time for the moment. 
 
142 See id. 
143 Press Release, U.S. Copyright Office, Certain Unpublished, Unregistered Works 
Enter Public Domain (Jan. 13, 2003), http://www.copyright.gov/pr/pdomain.html.  Any 
work that was neither published nor registered for copyright as of Jan. 1, 1978, and 
whose author died before 1933 entered the public domain on Jan. 1, 2003, unless it was 
published on or before Dec. 31, 2002. Id. 
144 Id. 
145 See S. 483, 104th Cong. § 2(c)(1) (1995), S. REP. NO 104-315, at 3 (1995). 
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PROFESSOR HANSEN: Okay. 
Chuck? 
MR. SIMS: Yes.  I want to make some comments about some 
of the points David made, because they were really the points that I 
think are fundamental here too. 
I am trained as a First Amendment lawyer.  At the ACLU, 
actually while I was still there, the Harper & Row case about 
Gerald Ford came up.146  There was a huge struggle within the 
ACLU at the time.  I didn’t know that I was going to be eventually 
getting some revenues from the motion picture studios or any other 
content providers.  I was making an ACLU public interest salary.  
But there was a huge battle within the organization about which 
side of that case to be on or whether to do it at all. 
Eventually, the organization did decide to support The Nation’s 
fair use claim. 
I happen to have felt at the time that the other argument was 
right, because I think the notion which Wendy kept repeating, that 
there is something fundamentally inconsistent between the First 
Amendment and copyright law, that the copyright law is somehow 
infringing First Amendment rights which we can only allow on 
sufferance for the exact moment in time at which we must, is 
fundamentally wrong. 
She kept talking aboutthis is the phrase she used 
repeatedly“propertization and privatization of ideas.”  There is 
nothing about either the Copyright Term Extension Act or 
copyright law generally that does that. 
It is true that for people who think that because it can be done it 
must be done, that there is something that feels binding about 
copyright law.  The silliest amicus brief I have ever seen in my life 
actually was a brief filed by Charles Nesson, who I like quite a lot, 
but this is a brief that I think is indicative of the fundamental error 
on that side of the table.147 
 
146 See Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., Inc., 471 U.S. 539 (1985). 
147 Brief of Professor Charles R. Nesson as Amicus Curiae, Universal City Studios, Inc. 
v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429 (2d Cir. 2001) (No. 00-CV-277), http://eon.law.harvard.edu/ 
openlaw/DVD/filings/NY/0510-amicus.html. 
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His brief was filed in the DVD case, which involved 
encryption of DVDs, was essentially as follows: I teach trial 
practice at Harvard Law School.  In trial practice I find it really 
important to show my students the key courtroom movie scenes, 
the scenes from Twelve Angry Men,148 Paul Newman’s scenes from 
The Verdict,149 other things like that.  This law violates my First 
Amendment rights because I cannot burn these scenes and put 
them on a CD and conveniently show them.150 
Well, the ideas of Gershwin’s works or of Virginia Woolf’s 
works, which are now going to be under copyright for some more 
years, or Robert Frost’s poetryI am just looking down at a list of 
works covered by the Sonny Bono Act which we included as an 
appendix to our brief151William Faulkner’s novels, 
Hemingway’s novelsthose of you who think that somehow your 
First Amendment rights are being violated by the fact that those 
works are in copyright, or your interests and free expression are 
somehow hampered, I don’t understand that argument. 
Anybody can go buy Hemingway, anybody can go buy 
Faulkner.  I do not think that the interest in having other people do 
Faulkner in black-face instead of white-face, or do “Porgy and 
Bess” with a South African white cast, or whatever it might be, 
makes any sense at all. 
The arguments, the ideas, in all of these works can be written 
about, can be talked about, can be taught.  But there is no 
meaningful infringement on freedom of speech or on any principle 
of freedom of speech that I understand by the existence of 
copyright or by its term. 
If the fact that To the Lighthouse is under copyright today is 
not a violation of the First Amendment, I do not know why 
keeping it for another twenty years under copyright is. 
 
148 TWELVE ANGRY MEN (MGM 1957). 
149 THE VERDICT (20th Century Fox 1982). 
150 Brief of Professor Charles R. Nesson as Amicus Curiae, Universal City Studios (No. 
00-CV-277). 
151 See Brief of Amici Curiae Association of American Publishers et al. app. at 1ap–2ap, 
Eldred v. Ashcroft, 123 S. Ct. 769 (2003) (No. 01-618). 
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I dare say that the argument that the motion picture studios 
made, which is that there will be more money invested in film 
preservation and dissemination of preserved films, more of that 
available, as a matter of economic theory, certainly as a matter of 
the framers’ preconception, if we have exclusive rights than if we 
do not, makes a lot of sense to me.152  It is certainly the assumption 
that the framers had.153 
The other point I think I want to make is a point that both Eben 
and Wendy made that I also think is really fundamental here.  
There is always a reference in these discussions to the grab for 
control, the grab for control so that there will be a pay-for-use 
world.  I guess that if you think that is what is going on, if you 
think that is what is underlying, the secret levers that are 
underlying these debates, have to do with Jack Valenti’s or 
Michael Eisner’s mania for more and more power, you will end up 
where they end up. 
I suggest that there is another model that bears a lot more 
relationship to reality in thinking about this, which is that what is 
happening in Congress and in these debates does not reflect a grab 
for more power; it reflects the insecurity of those whose ability to 
extract the revenues that copyright law offers is more and more 
threatened and is leakier and leakier by the day. 
And so what is from one point of view this mania for a pay-
per-use world is from the other side, watching what has happened 
with Napster, the motion picture industry or the book industry 
worrying about being Napsterized, and efforts, whether 
technologically or through new kinds of legislation like the DMCA 
or maybe extension of term, to try to preserve a portion of the 
revenues that they were promised, that they counted on, and that 
are leaking away by teen-age hackers who because it can be done 
think that they have a right to do it. 
PROFESSOR HANSEN: Okay.  We are going to open it up 
now to questions. 
 
152 See Brief for the Respondent at 34, Eldred (No. 01-618) (“Applying the CTEA’s 
copyright term to subsisting copyrights also enhances the incentive for copyright holders 
‘to restore older works and further disseminate them to the public.’”). 
153 See Brief for the Respondent at 31–32, Eldred (No. 01-618). 
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Let me just say one thing.  I agree with Wendy that one 
advantage of works going into the public domain is you can then 
have different versions or derivative works that allow people with 
different views to make statements that may be impossible to make 
by simply creating a new work.  The problem is that I do not think 
as a practical matter this happens very often.  All right.  Why don’t 
we go out to questions from the audience.  State your name and if 
you have an affiliation. 
QUESTIONER: My name is Ting Kwok.  I go to Law School 
here. 
I just wanted, first, to disabuse the moderator’s notion of 
saying that eliminating copyrights and putting them in the public 
domain would not lower the price of tickets because if the charge 
for the use of the copyright were a per-use charge, that would 
either shift up or down the marginal cost curve.  If there are any 
economists around here, that would mean that the price would go 
down with a lower or no fee. 
But there is something else.  There is a benefit of being able to 
restrict use, in that if you were a consumer of this type of material, 
a scholarly consumer that needed to look at the footnotes and stuff 
like that, if the work itself was not something like Plato, which was 
very well-recognizedthere would be only one version, so it 
would be much easier to look things up.  That is a very minor 
benefit.  But I am not saying that it is going to be eitherit 
depends on who the consumer is as to whether or not I think it 
would be beneficial to have stronger or weaker copyright 
protection. 
But my question is: Have you noticed the absence of 
Schnapper from the petitioner’s brief, and whether or not you think 
that means that Lessig has just given up on an argument?  If you 
look at the appeals court opinion, there seems to be a little bit of a 
hissy fit about whether or not Schnapper applies.  Sentelle says one 
thing and Ginsburg says something else.154  So if you could 
comment on Schnapper. 
 
154 See Eldred v. Reno, 239 F.3d 372, 383 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (Sentelle, J., dissenting) 
(arguing that the holding of Schnapper [v. Foley, 667 F.2d 102, 112 (D.C. Cir. 1981),] 
was that “[C]ongress need not ‘require that each copyrighted work be shown to promote 
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MR. SIMS: Well, at the Supreme Court nobody cares about 
D.C. Circuit precedent, so in the D.C. Circuit it was a big deal, but 
once it got to the Supreme Court, they couldn’t care less. 
There are a bunch of studies on book pricing, and all of them 
show that book prices for works out of copyrightbooks by 
Hawthorne, whateverdo not differ markedly or meaningfully at 
all from works that are in copyright.155  I think that was the basis of 
Hugh’s suggestion.  I would assume that whether or not there is a 
copyright expiration, the fact is that consumers do not get the 
benefit of a lowered price reflecting some sort of copyright 
interest.  It sounds logical.  I’m sure economists think that it ought 
to happen, but it does not in the real world. 
PROFESSOR MOGLEN: Assuming no change in the means of 
distribution, which is of course the whole point.  The change in the 
mode of distribution is revolutionary in its nature.  It is a shift of 
the kind that economists treat as long-run change due to 
technological adjustment.  What it does is to eliminate all of those 
inflexibilities in distribution, like bookstores and publishers, the 
result of which is that the price of the public domain literature goes 
to marginal cost. 
If you want it as bits on a screen, the marginal cost is zero.  If 
you want it on paper, the marginal cost is what it costs for print-on-
demand services, to which the publishers, knowing that book 
 
the useful arts,’” and “[i]nsofar as [the introductory language of the Copyright Clause] is 
taken to be anything more than the determination concerning that limited analysis, it is 
not a holding but simply dicta (perhaps obiter dicta) and not binding on future panels”) 
(quoting Mitchell Bros. Film Group v. Cinema Adult Theater, 604 F.2d 852, 860 (5th Cir. 
1979)), aff’d sub nom. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 123 S. Ct. 769 (2003).  See also id. at 378 
(stating that the holding of Schnapper “rejected the argument ‘that the introductory 
language of the Copyright Clause constitutes a limit on congressional power’”) (quoting 
Schnapper, 667 F.2d at 112). 
155 Editor’s Note: Although we have not been able to locate the studies referred to by 
Mr. Sims, the following examples may be instructive.  Modern Library Classics sells 
Hawthorne’s Mosses from the Old Manse for $13.95.  A free version of this title is 
available at http://www.eldritchpress.org/nh/mosses.html.  Similarly, Vintage Books has 
recently published a paperback edition of The Buffalo Soldier (a work still protected by 
copyright) by contemporary author Chris Bohjalian.  It too retails for $13.95. See 
http://www.randomhouse.com/catalog/display.pperl?0375725466. 
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publishing is within a generation of conclusion, are now shifting 
their business.156 
In the end, there is a bitstream.  Either you will be excluded if 
you cannot pay, or the rules will have changed and you will choose 
whether to take the bitstream in a form which allows you to read at 
no cost, or there is a “McDonald’s of text” on the cornercall it 
Kinko’swhich manufacturers books for you if books are a thing 
you want.  Most of us probably will not because the methods of 
reading free are superior to the methods of reading on dead trees 
and within a generation we shift. 
There are forty or fifty novels in my book bag at any time.  
They are in my laptop.  I read them typeset the way I want them, 
on a display whose background texture and color is set the way I 
want it at the moment, given the reading conditions.  I am not 
better off going down to the corner bookstore and buying a copy of 
Hawthorne at the existing price, which is largely determined by the 
inflexibilities of the distribution system. 
I entirely agree with Chuck.  There is either a grab for control 
on the side of his clients or on the side of my clients.  This is 
known as class conflict.  It results in what is known as the 
appropriation of the means of production by one side or the other.  
At present, there are five companies that control more than ninety 
percent of the world’s popular music.157  They behave like an 
oligopoly.  They reduce output and raise price.  CDs cost $17.00 
and most musicians do not live from music. 
After the end of their mode of distribution—which is being 
undertaken not just by the twelve-year olds, but also by the artists 
who see that there is little value for most of them in the existing 
distribution system—there will be many more musicians in the 
world and music will be more freely available to everyone who 
wants it.  That is an unalloyed good. 
 
156 See JASON EPSTEIN, BOOK BUSINESS: PUBLISHING PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE 177–
92 (2002). 
157 Moglen, supra note 39, at 2. 
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There are seven companies in the world that control more than 
ninety percent of the Western movie market,158 and they also 
exclude output and raise price.  When they are gone, and both 
screen exhibition and, more importantly, personal viewing of video 
is no longer subject to their control, more people will make video 
art and people will not have to pay for it, so they will be able 
voluntarily to support what they love. 
This model currently makes the best broadcast electronic news 
in the United States at NPR.159  It currently makes the best 
software in the world, which is the product of my Free Software 
Movement.  It currently produces a whole range of cultural 
institutions.  And, more importantly, before the law of copyright, it 
was the model that produced and distributed all of human culture. 
It is not a speculative proposition to suggest that the decay of 
the propertarian capitalist mode for the production and distribution 
of culture would result in more culture, available to more people, 
more easily, more freely. 
The primary threat to freedom of speech is not the freedom of 
speech that is involved in being able to publish Kahlil Gibran, 
about which of course I agree with you—it is utterly unimportant.  
The primary threat to freedom of speech is the ancillary harm to 
the freedom of technical communication being done by your 
clients through your extraordinarily skillful means.160 
I now have clients who are enjoined all over the world from 
explaining how DVDs work, a thing that they have an absolute 
right to do under my conception of the First Amendment.161 
MR. SIMS: Eben, you know that is not true. 
PROFESSOR MOGLEN: No.  It is factually accurate.  Which 
part of it are you challenging? 
 
158 Universal City Studios, Inc.; Paramount Pictures Corporation; Metro-Goldwyn-
Mayer Studios, Inc.; Sony Pictures, Inc; Warner Brothers; Disney Enterprises, Inc.; and 
Twentieth Century Fox Film Corporation. See MPAA, at http://www.mpaa.org/about/ 
index.htm (last visited Apr. 14, 2003). 
159 See Nat’l Pub. Radio Found., About NPR, at http://zeus.npr.org/about/about.jhtml 
(last visited Mar. 10, 2003). 
160 See Eben Moglen, Free Software Matters: Exploring the Frontiers of Unfreedom, 
NATION, May 10, 2002, at 2. 
161 See Universal City Studios, 273 F.3d at 429. 
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MR. SIMS: The injunction, as you know, did not cover 
explaining anything.  It covered the provision of the utility.162 
PROFESSOR MOGLEN: You assume that the best way of 
explaining how DVDs work is not an executable computer code, 
and that is false.  It is the case that that injunction covers limericks 
written by witnesses in my lawsuit. 
MR. SIMS: We are not going to argue about this. 
PROFESSOR MOGLEN: All right, fine. 
MR. SIMS: Anybody here who thinks that reading Thomas 
Wolfe before it was edited by Maxwell Perkins working for a large 
publishing company is preferable to reading Thomas Wolfe ought 
to do it.  Anybody who thinks that the next Saul Bellow who is 
now eighteen or twenty years old will find his market, will find his 
voice, and will be able to create what he otherwise would have by 
self-publishing on the Internet instead of by going to a publisher 
which has costs and copyrights and paper, is free to spend all the 
time you want looking through the Internet and trying to find 
which one of the billion people self-publishing is that one. 
But the model that Eben is talking about, which has a lot in 
connection with information-wants-to-be-free nonsense we heard 
ten years ago, that model is not one I suggest that is going to lead 
to the glories of American culture. 
PROFESSOR HANSEN: Okay.  This is an interesting debate. 
If there are problems with concentration in a particular 
copyright-related market, you have antitrust laws to deal with 
oligopolies and concentration as with all other types of markets.  It 
is not a failing attributable to copyright protection.  In fact, if there 
are any places in our economy where there is less fear about 
oligopoly, it is the copyright-driven industries.   Moreover, more 
creators now can become their own publishers and producers 
because of this great new  technology.  So there is no reason to 
destroy the old, we can have the old and Eben’s new world side by 
side.  Those who don’t want to exercise copyright rights do not 
have to do so.  Those who want to, can. 
 
162 Id. at 441. 
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So if you are right, Eben, that your vision is the one everyone 
will accept, then there should be no fear of copyright.  The reason 
you fear copyright and want it abolished  is that you know deep 
down inside that your view is not a view shared by most creators 
and distributors—people who want to be remunerated and to make 
a living.  If your view were right, you would not have to destroy 
copyright because people are always free to provide royalty-free 
licenses, as some have done in the software industry. 
Ultimately I think you are afraid of the marketplace.  You have 
to control it because you don’t have faith in your vision as being 
one that most people will choose. 
It is strange that I am a moderator, I must say. 
Let’s go to another question.  There must be another question 
out there. 
QUESTIONER: Professor Hansen, I have to say that I am 
really disappointed at the unprofessional way you are handling this 
panel.  I think if you really wanted to take a voice on this panel, 
you should have put yourself on the panel and gotten yourself a 
moderate moderator.  I think you have interfered in the exchange 
by being such a person who’s got a point of view that has to be 
made.  I’m surprised that this happened. 
That is all I have to say. 
PROFESSOR HANSEN: Then you obviously haven’t seen me 
before. 
QUESTIONER: No.  I have seen you before. 
PROFESSOR HANSEN: So basically this is it.  I am what you 
see and this is what you get, and if you don’t like it well it is just 
like everything else—you are entitled to your opinion.  You do not 
like what I am doing.  I like what I am doing.  And I happen to be 
up here and you happen to be down there, and that is just the way it 
is.  Maybe the next time you will be up here. 
QUESTIONER: If I am, I hope I will have a different attitude. 
PROFESSOR HANSEN: Do you actually have anything 
further or is that it? 
QUESTIONER: I was going to askyou talked about pushing 
away the idea of the term of copyright.  Now, I have a client who 
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reproduces wonderful old technical books that are in the public 
domain.  He brings to light to an intellectual audience all over the 
world books that have lain fallow for years because it is free to 
reproduce.  That is the thing that separates him from the ability to 
make it.  If he had to pay fees, that area of his production would 
not take place.  So I think we are oversimplifying this whole 
business. 
Secondly, I am a photographer.  I teach artists’ rights.  I am a 
photographer.  I have never seen a more aggressive user of 
copyright than the Disney World, who actually tells me you can’t 
even photograph their buildings at Disney World and make any use 
of it. 
So I would be very happy when their copyright runs out so I 
would not have that arrogance in front of me. 
Thank you. 
PROFESSOR HANSEN: Another question? 
QUESTIONER: I feel like I’m back in college twenty years 
ago. 
I also want to say to Professor Hansen I wish I were still at 
Fordham so I could take one of your classes.  I missed that when I 
was here. 
I was curious as to a response from the other panelists as to Mr. 
Carson’s comment that he believes or suspects that the Sonny 
Bono Act signified the end of this process whereby the copyright 
protection has been expanded.  Do the other panelists believe that 
we are not going to see within our lifetime, or within a reasonable 
period of time, additional extensions proactively or retroactively? 
PROFESSOR MOGLEN: Well, if it is true, it is because we 
get our work done within the next twenty years and there is no 
subject for further discussion.  If I do not have them down within 
twenty years, of course they will be back.  They have no more 
intention of giving away Mickey Mouse or Donald Duck or any of 
the rest of the franchise in 2024 than they had of giving it away in 
2004. 
The proposition that Chuck offers about their fear is absolutely 
correct. 
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One of the things that was happening in October of last year, 
after the various events downtown, is that I was spending a fair 
amount of time on the Hill trying to keep Disney from succeeding 
in getting Senator Hollings’s bill that would have crawled inside 
every computer and piece of software on earth and made it protect 
copyright their way from being enacted.163 
So I would be going in to Hollings’ staff, and out would be 
coming Preston Padden, the chief Washington representative of 
Disney, former President of ABC News.  Preston and his friends 
were the only people in all of Washington last October who 
weren’t wearing an American flag pin in their lapel.  They had 
Donald Duck.  I can tell you, the feeling of that was really quite 
extraordinary.  It was “Our empire is our empire.  Don’t mess with 
us.” 
I entirely agree with Chuck, that it is actually fear 
masquerading as bravado.  They have billions of dollars available 
and they have enormous leverage over American politics because 
they make image.  But they are frightened. They are right to be 
frightened. 
Far from being unconfident, I know what is going to happen to 
them.  They will be back in twenty years to buy more legislation, if 
we allow bought legislation in the United States in twenty years 
and if they exist. 
You all, if you do not believe my point of view, might at least 
want to have campaign finance reform so that they cannot do it.  
And if you believe me, you might want to join up and make sure 
that they are not around in twenty years to try again. 
PROFESSOR HANSEN: I was just told some people didn’t 
identify themselves for the record.  Did you identify yourself for 
the record? 
PARTICIPANT: My name is Len Spire.  I am a professor at 
FIT. 
 
163 See Security Systems Standards and Certification Act at http://cryptome.org/sssca. 
htm. See also Eben Moglan, Free Software Matters: More Menace from the Mouse, 
NATION, Mar. 19, 2002, at 1. 
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PROFESSOR HANSEN: I just wanted that for the purposes of 
my lawyer. 
The gentleman back there? 
PARTICIPANT: Steve Vicker.  I am an attorney in New York. 
PROFESSOR HANSEN: Okay. 
I don’t think there ever is going to be a further extension of 
term of copyright protection..  I think this was a one-off based on 
reaction to the Term Directive in Europe.  I do not see it happening 
again.  It certainly will never happen in Europe; it is not going to 
happen in the rest of the world, and it is not going to happen here, 
in my view. 
Another one?  Someone else? 
QUESTIONER: My name is Ed Cramer.  I am an attorney in 
Manhattan. 
Without judging the merits or commenting on that, Professor, 
is it the logical extension of your position that copyrightnot 
extension, but all copyrightshould be abolished? 
PROFESSOR MOGLEN: In the long run, the answer to that 
question is most certainly yes. 
QUESTIONER: Thank you. 
PROFESSOR MOGLEN: The proper way of doing it, I think, 
is transitionally, through the kind of mixed economy that Professor 
Hansen was talking about.  It is correct that there ought to be no 
reason for the absence of a lengthy period of coexistence between 
the free production and distribution worlds and the proprietary 
production and distribution worlds.  In that Professor Hansen is 
correct. 
I believe that what prevents that process of coexistence is 
precisely the defensive measures of the owners that Chuck was 
talking about.  I think their concern for desertion is correct.  I do 
not think it is primarily that they are afraid the audience will 
desert.  I think it is primarily that they are afraid the creators will 
desert, because creators get a very bad deal from the systems of 
proprietary distribution.  It is possible, I think likely, that at least in 
music, and ultimately in video production as well, you see the 
producers deserting the media of distribution that currently exists. 
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The result, defensively on the part of those industries, is to 
attempt to make our modes of behavior illegal.  The justification 
for doing so is that if we create the free distribution system, it will 
be used for piracy, and so it ought to be prohibited from occurring 
because it will abet piracy if it exists at all.  This is the VCR 
argument again, as you remember.164  A technology should be 
eliminated because it is seen as contributing to copyright 
infringement. 
From my point of view, the fact that it contributes to copyright 
infringement is either neutral or good but not important.  In any 
event, it is not a reason for preventing the evolution of the system 
of coexistence that Professor Hansen was talking about. 
After a generation or so of coexistence between free 
development and proprietary development, my forthcoming book 
argues, it is safe to do away with the property protection for ideas 
altogether. 
MR. SIMS: There were amicicreative amici,165 not just copy 
amiciwho filed briefs in Eldred, and the symphonic composers, 
for example, people like John Corigliano, Libby Larsen, Stephen 
Paulusall sorts of symphonic conductors filed a brief supporting 
term extension.166  They certainly do not think that their careers 
can be made, their families can be fed, and that they can keep 
creating, on the basis of a free distribution system.167  I think quite 
to the contrary. 
One of the interesting points they made is that, unlike popular 
music, serious music, academic symphonic music, tends not to find 
its audience for many, many yearsmay never find it, but if it 
does find it, it is often twenty-thirty years down the pike, so that 
for them term extension was particularly important.168 
 
164 See Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984). 
165 See, e.g., Brief of Amici Curiae Association of American Publishers et al., Eldred v. 
Ashcroft, 123 S. Ct. 769 (2003) (No. 01-618), http://eon.law.harvard.edu/openlaw/ 
eldredvashcroft/supct/opp-amici/aap.pdf. 
166 See Brief of Amici Curiae Symphonic and Concert Composers, Eldred (No. 01-618), 
http://eon.law.harvard.edu/openlaw/eldredvashcroft/supct/opp-amici/composers.pdf. 
167 Id. at 17. 
168 Id. at 9–13. 
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Other creatorsDavid Mamet, Richard Avedonfiled briefs 
also.169  All of the creative people of that sort filed briefs on the 
side of copyright. 
The notion of a free distribution system sounds utopian and not 
practical. 
PROFESSOR HANSEN: Okay. 
Another question? 
We will come back for second turns.  Let’s get everyone who 
has a first question. 
QUESTIONER: My name is Jordan Altman.  I am a student 
and I am a staff member of the Journal. 
I know that we want to create incentives for new works to 
come out, but would the panel have a problem if we just gave a 
shorter set number of years of protection, like fifty years from the 
works’ creation, sort of like we have in the patent system?170  I just 
do not see the merit or incentive in counting years from the 
author’s death in determining copyright protection. 
MS. SELTZER: I would have no problem with a shorter and 
fixed term with a return to requirements of registration so that 
copyright at least serves the purpose of making known when the 
work was created and when it would be available to the public.171  
I do not see particular value in assuming that the copyright should 
continue after the author’s death when any other kind of productive 
worker has to make his or her own provision for heirs. 
 
169 See Brief of Amici Curiae Association of American Publishers et al., Eldred (No. 01-
618). 
170 See 35 U.S.C. § 154 (2000). 
171 Speaker’s Note: I recognize the conflict with the Berne Convention, but a major 
rethinking of copyright law should at least start with a clean slate. See Petitioners’ Reply 
Brief at 7, Eldred (No. 01-618) (noting that “[t]he beneficiaries of the CTEA need do 
nothing to receive its benefit; the gift is automatic”). See also Festo Co. v. Shoketsu 
Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 122 S. Ct. 1831, 1837 (2002) (noting that “clarity is 
essential to promote progress . . . .  A [rights] holder should know what he owns, and the 
public should know what he does not”). 
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PROFESSOR HANSEN: One distinction is that we have at 
least two treaties that would make it difficult.172  As a pure policy 
issue, what the term should be is a different matter. 
 I don’t think there is any particular number that is right or 
wrong in this.  But there is an analogy to others who through a 
lifetime of work pass on existing businesses, for example, to heirs.  
Creators who through a lifetime of work need to be able to pass on 
the result of their efforts which is contained in intangible property 
protected by copyright. 
But I agree with Wendy. I do not think that there is any 
particular time that is the right time.  But we are stuck with life 
plus fifty because of Berne.  We went to the life plus fifty in the 
1976 Act only because of wanting to eventually get into Berne.173  
It certainly wasn’t an active policy choice of what should be the 
best term of protection. 
MR. CARSON: I agree.  It is Berne that would really prevent 
us from doing that, unless we decided we wanted to opt out of the 
international system.174  In this day and age, you’ve heard ample 
evidence of how copyright has international implications.  You 
cannot separate yourself from the rest of the world if you believe in 
copyright.  You can’t wall off the rest of the world.  So we are 
pretty much stuck with Berne. 
Personallyand I hasten to add that this isn’t the Copyright 
Office’s viewI look back wistfully at the terms of the 1909 Act 
in a number of respects, including copyright term and some of the 
formalities.175  But those days are gone and the only way you will 
ever get them backand you will notwill be if you decide you 
want to abandon the international obligations we have assumed. 
PROFESSOR HANSEN: We are ready for a second question. 
QUESTIONER: Ed Cramer. 
 
172 See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, T.I.A.S. 
1700, 55 U.N.T.S 194; Berne Convention, supra note 16. 
173 See Berne Convention, supra note 16. 
174 Id. 
175 See Copyright Act of 1909, Pub. L. No. 349, 35 Stat. 1075 (1909) (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C. (2000)). 
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I’d like to follow up on that and ask you whether you felt 
ultimately that copyright should be abolished.  You gave me a 
quick answer.  The answer was yes. 
Now, BMI (Broadcast Music, Inc.) was a client of mine for 
about seventeen years.  I became its President and Chief Executive 
for nineteen years.  Neither BMI nor the ASCAP (American 
Society of Composers, Authors, and Publishers) operate for profit, 
so that profit motive that you were talking about does not exist for 
them.176  Hundreds of thousands of writers depend upon that 
income.177 
So if you do not have organizations like that, which are 
predicated on copyright protection, because you don’t find people 
coming up and voluntarily paying for that musicno go, you can’t 
get a nightclub or a gin mill or a radiothey are not going to pay 
you unless you have copyright protection.  Without that 
protectionI am not talking about the termbut without that 
protection, which was your ultimate answer, then big trouble for 
creative people. 
PROFESSOR MOGLEN: Well, we feel differently about that, 
not because we feel differently about the role of the intermediaries, 
although, as I’m sure you understand, there are lots of musicians 
who think that the nonprofit status of ASCAP and BMI has not 
prevented their capture by the recording industry.  But I am with 
you about this. 
The intermediaries and the collection societies are important, 
regardless of whether what they are distributing are voluntary 
contributions or coerced contributions. 
I disagree with you that there is any reason to suppose that a 
coercive system of music production and distribution in which you 
can only have it if you pay for it actually rewards artists better than 
a free system of distribution in which people pay what they want 
for music.  The reason is that the recording industry presently 
 
176 See The American Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers, at 
http://ascap.com/1p_about_ascap.html (last visited Feb. 5, 2003); BMI, About BMI, at 
http://www.bmi.com/about/backgrounder.asp (last visited Feb. 5, 2003). 
177 Id.  
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keeps ninety-four percent of the dollar.178  We can do a lot better 
for artists if we take that ninety-four percent which currently goes 
to thugs and rebate a smaller proportion of it to artists overall. 
What happens in the twenty-first century is that it becomes 
much easier to pay not just musicians but recording engineers and 
songwriters and others through the work of collection societies, 
such as BMI or its follow-ons. It becomes easier because the 
network is the means by which, at the point of delivery of music, 
the listener has an opportunity to remunerate easily and 
frictionlessly the people that she wants to pay, the consequence of 
which is a very much improved situation for the producers. 
This is what we show with respect to computer software in the 
world of free software.  This is what the Future of Music 
Coalition179 and the other parties conducting that conversation for 
the benefit of the creative community are modeling for them so 
they can make their own decisions. 
In the end, again I am with Professor Hansen about this.  It’s a 
matter of choice.  Within the next ten years, I believe, and I think 
even Carey Sherman180 believes, that you are going to see 
recording artists deserting the recording system in droves. 
My friend, Chuck D, I think is correct about this.181  In five 
years, he says, there will be 5,000 recording companies and a 
million recording artists.  Nobody makes $10 million a record and 
no musician has a day job.182  That is justice.  It is worth fighting 
for.  You should too. 
 
 178 See, e.g., Peter Jan Honigsberg, The Evolution and Revolution of Napster, 36 
U.S.F. L. REV. 473, 505 (2002), (“Artists receive royalties from the record company 
usually ranging from 10% to 20% of the suggested retail list price, less the dubious 
deductions for packaging (20% to 25% of the retail price), promotional and other 
giveaways, returns, and breakage (10%).”). 
 179 See Future of Music Coalition, at http://www.futureofmusic.org (last visited Mar. 
10, 2003). 
 180 Carey Sherman is the General Counsel for the Recording Industry Association of 
America. See Matt Richtel, New Suit Filed to Bar Trading Music on Net, N.Y. TIMES, 
May 25, 2001, at C2. 
 181 Chuck D is a member of the rap group Public Enemy. See Geoffrey Himes, Chuck 
D Hits Close to Home, WASH. POST, Oct. 23, 1996, at D07. 
 182 See, eg., Chuck D, ‘Free Music’ Can Free the Artist, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 29, 2000, 
at A13. 
5 - PANEL II FORMAT 5/30/03  7:56 AM 
830 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. 13:771 
QUESTIONER: You didn’t answer my question. 
PROFESSOR HANSEN: I think we have just gotten the word 
that the time is up. 
Let me say I am happy to agree with Eben on this, since I  
think the recording companies have had some horrible practices to 
account for, and if this leads to their downfall, I am with you on 
that. 
PROFESSOR MOGLEN: Thank you. 
PROFESSOR HANSEN: Let me say that it has been a 
tremendous panel.  I apologize if I have offended anyone. Let’s 
have a round of applause for our speakers. 
 
